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ABSTRACT 
 
 This thesis attempts to challenge the common perceptions 
regarding the Janissaries and their destruction in 1826. Our understanding 
of the Janissaries and Vaka-i Hayriye (the Auspicious Event) has been 
shaped by the official view of the Ottoman state as well as modern 
historiography, which has taken the accounts of the Ottoman official 
historians at face value. Conventional historiography has argued that 
while the Janissaries were the linchpin of Ottoman military strength from 
the 15th to the 18th century, their role and integrity began to erode in the 
18th century and more intensely in the 19th century. The Janissaries were 
no longer the bulwark of the Ottoman state, rather, a clique of corrupt 
soldiers who terrorized the Ottoman civil population and a handful of 
traitors to the greater interests of the Ottoman state and society. Thus, 
destruction of the Janissaries had become indispensable for the good of 
the society as a whole.  
This study presents a critique of historiography as such and 
questions the accusations leveled against the Janissaries. Moreover, it 
finds that the Janissaries had strong ties with both elite and non-elite 
groups in Ottoman society. The fact that these societal groups did not 
submit to the modernization policies of the Ottoman state pushed the 
Ottoman government to eliminate the groups who opposed its new 
policies. In this context, the Janissaries had become a bastion of resistance 
against the modernization project of the Ottoman state, as a result of their 
profound relationships with different societal groups. I argue that the 
connections of the Janissaries with the rest of the society constituted a 
serious threat to the modernization process and this was the main reason 
for their destruction rather than corruption or obsoleteness.     
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ÖZET 
 
 Bu tez Yeniçerilere ve Yeniçeriliğin 1826 yılında ilgasına ilişkin 
yaygın görüşleri sorgulamaya çalışmaktadır. Yeniçerilere ve Vaka-i 
Hayriye’ye (Hayırlı Hadise) bakış açımız Osmanlı Devleti’nin resmi 
görüşü ve Osmanlı resmi tarihçilerinin anlatımlarını yüzeysel bir biçimde 
değerlendiren modern tarihçilik tarafından şekillendirilmiştir. Geleneksel 
tarihçiliğe göre Yeniçeriler 15. ve 18. yüzyıllar arasında Osmanlı askeri 
gücünün esasını teşkil etmelerine rağmen, daha önceki rolleri ve 
sağlamlıkları 18. yüzyılda ve daha da yoğunlaşarak 19. yüzyılda aşınmaya 
başlamıştı. Yeniçeriler Osmanlı Devleti’nin koruyucusu olmaktan çıkıp 
Osmanlı sivil halkını şiddete maruz bırakan ve Osmanlı devlet ve 
toplumunun yüce çıkarlarına ihanet eden yozlaşmış bir asker grubu 
olmuşlardı. Böylelikle, Yeniçerilerin toplumun iyiliği için yokedilmesi 
kaçınılmaz olmuştu. 
 Bu çalışma böyle bir tarih anlayışının eleştirisini sunmakta ve 
Yeniçerilere yöneltilen suçlamaları sorgulamaktadır. Araştırmamız 
göstermektedir ki, Yeniçerilerin Osmanlı toplumunun hem seçkin 
gruplarıyla hem de seçkin olmayan gruplarıyla güçlü bağları vardı. Bu 
toplumsal grupların Osmanlı Devleti’nin modernleşme siyasetine razı 
olmayışı, Osmanlı hükümetini yeni politikalarına karşı çıkan grupları 
ortadan kaldırmaya itti. Bu bağlamda, Yeniçeriler çeşitli toplumsal 
gruplarla varolagelen derin ilişkilerinin bir sonucu olarak Osmanlı 
Devleti’nin modernleşme projesine karşı direnişin kalesi haline 
gelmişlerdi. Bana göre, Yeniçerilerin toplumun diğer kesimleriyle olan 
ilişkileri modernleşme sürecine ciddi bir tehlike oluşturdu ve Yeniçeriliğin 
ilgasının asıl nedeni Yeniçerilerin çürümüşlüğü ya da kullanışsızlığından 
çok modernleşme sürecine karşı oluşturdukları tehditti.    
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INTRODUCTION 
  
 
The destruction of the Janissaries in 1826 by Mahmud II, known as Vaka-i 
Hayriye (the Auspicious Event), represents a crucial turning point in the history 
of the modernization of the Ottoman Empire. The reform events that had already 
started in the eighteenth century accelerated and the nature of the reforms 
changed significantly after 1826. This event paved the way for the more 
fundamental reform efforts of the nineteenth century. Indeed, only after the 
abolition of the Janissary corps could the state take serious steps in modernizing 
Ottoman state and society.  
The Ottoman state’s official view of this event is reflected by the name 
historiography has given to it, which is Vaka-i Hayriye. The Janissary corps has 
been presented as an institution that was an ideal establishment during the 
earlier periods of the Ottoman Empire but gradually became obsolete, useless, 
and even harmful to society. That the Ottoman state rescued Ottoman society 
from this institution was considered an ‘auspicious event’ by the vakanüvises 
(official historians of the Ottoman state) and their subsequent followers.  
Conventional historiography provides us with a state-centered view of the 
Janissaries and the history of their destruction. Furthermore, the dominant 
historiography of the Janissary corps is unable to clearly present us a picture, 
 1 
which would explain the real nature of this corps and its relationship with the 
rest of Ottoman society. Historiography as such does not recognize the social 
foundations and ties of the Janissaries to the rest of the society and treats it as an 
abstract institution that did not have any relationships with Ottoman society. 
Hence, placing all of its emphasis on the wrongdoings of the members of the 
Janissary corps.  
This thesis aims to present a critique of the traditional historiography of 
the Janissaries and the destruction of the Janissary corps as well as to contribute 
to our understanding of the true nature of the complex structures and 
relationships between the Janissaries and the different elite and non-elite interest 
groups within Ottoman society. It will argue that the Janissary corps was not a 
mere military institution that had no profound relationship with the rest of 
Ottoman society. On the contrary, the Janissaries had, in fact, complex and strong 
ties with the other social groups of Ottoman society, which made their 
destruction a turning point in the modernization process of Ottoman society as a 
whole. 
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CHAPTER I: HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE JANISSARY CORPS 
AND VAKA-İ HAYRİYE (THE AUSPICIOUS EVENT) 
 
Official Historiography 
 The earliest account of the destruction of the Janissaries is that of Mehmed 
Esad Efendi, who actively participated in Vaka-i Hayriye. He was a member of 
the Ottoman ulema (religious scholars) class, and the official historian of the 
Ottoman Empire at the time of Vaka-i Hayriye. Modern historiography of the 
Janissaries has been under the influence of Esad Efendi’s work. Until recently, 
his views on the Janissaries were determinant in shaping the historiography of 
the Janissaries. Moreover, his views were identical to those of the Ottoman 
government, making his work crucial for the purpose of this study.  
Esad Efendi devoted a whole book to the destruction of the Janissary 
corps. In his book Üss-i Zafer1, one can find the Ottoman state’s ultimate official 
views about the Janissaries together with the reasons that were enumerated by 
the Ottoman government in explaining and legitimizing Vaka-i Hayriye. In Esad 
Efendi’s words, the Ottoman government abolished the Janissary corps because 
of their lack of discipline and the crimes they committed against the Ottoman 
public. These crimes, which were committed against almost all segments of the 
                                                 
1 Mehmed Esad Efendi, Üss-i Zafer, İstanbul, 1243/1827. 
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society, were not unique to Mahmud II’s reign according to Esad Efendi.2 
Because of the crimes the Janissaries committed combined with the obsoleteness 
of the Janissary corps militarily, they had to be destroyed and this was for the 
good of the Ottoman state and society. 
Esad Efendi’s description of Vaka-i Hayriye represents an ideological 
standpoint of an opponent of a certain group, in this case the Janissaries, rather 
than an unbiased historical account written by an historian. He severely 
condemns the Janissaries and those who were affiliated with them or supported 
them, concluding that their destruction was absolutely necessary. Given his 
commitment to the Ottoman government’s service as a vakanüvis (official 
historian) and his active participation in Vaka-i Hayriye, 3 the accusations made 
by him should not be taken at face value. His central objective was to be able to 
show that the Janissaries were a corrupt military group, whose relations with 
Ottoman society were limited to the lowest and parasitic social classes. This is 
not to dispute that the Janissaries may have committed such crimes, however, 
the reasons why the Ottoman government attacked the Janissaries were much 
more complex than how it is described in Esad Efendi’s work. The significant 
historic contribution of Üss-i Zafer resides more in revealing the Ottoman state’s 
official view about the Janissaries than in reflecting the historical facts. The 
                                                 
2 “…al-i Osman sultan süleyman han tayyib zaman-ı intizam-nişanında dahi defaatle huruc 
iderek buyut-ı müslimini talan ve na-hak yere ulema ve rical ve kibar ve sigarı gerek ol asırda ve 
gerek sonralarda peyderpey hezaran nezar hun-ı mazlumini rizan edüb…” Esad Efendi, p.67. 
3 Donald Quataert, “Janissaries, Artisans and the Question of Ottoman Decline,” in Workers, 
Peasants and Economic Change in the Ottoman Empire 1730-1914, ed. Donald Quataert, İstanbul, 
1993, p.198.  
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complexities of the relationships between the Janissaries and the Ottoman 
government have yet to be fully studied.  
 The second vakanüvis who wrote about the Janissaries is Ahmed Lutfi 
Efendi. In his Tarih-i Lutfi,4 we find a similar, if not identical, approach to the 
Janissaries.5 Although Tarih-i Lutfi was written at a much later date, it presents 
the same arguments about the Janissaries. This indicates that the Ottoman 
government’s view of the Janissaries did not change from the 1820s to the 1870s. 
There are various interesting details in Lutfi’s account, which may not be found 
in Üss-i Zafer, but the ideological vantage point regarding the Janissaries is the 
same. 
 Lutfi Efendi provides us with valuable information about the efforts of 
Selim III in changing the military structures and in founding the Nizam-ı Cedid 
(New Order). He mentions the superiority of the European states in terms of 
their discipline and advanced military science6 at the time of Selim III. As a 
military institution that was supposed to compete with those contemporary 
foreign armies, the Janissaries represented a backward army, according to the 
Ottoman government. The logical conclusion of this argument is that the 
Janissary corps had to be either re-formed or abolished. As Lutfi Efendi 
describes, Selim III had two options: 1) destructing the Janissary corps and 
                                                 
4 Ahmed Lutfi Efendi, Tarih-i Lutfi, vol.1, İstanbul, 1873. 
5 “…nizamat-ı mevzualarına halel gelerek sonraları fuhşiyyat ve taaddiyata…itaatsizliğe 
cür®etleri sebebiyle idareleri na-kabil…” Lutfi Efendi, p.7. 
6 “…düvel-i ecnebiyye askerinin suret-i nizam ve intizam-ı hareketleri ve fünun-ı harbiyyede 
hasıl ettikleri asar-ı galibaneleri...” Lutfi Efendi, p.7. 
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founding a new military corps or 2) founding a new military corps under the 
name Nizam-ı Cedid without abolishing the Janissaries.7 Selim III chose the 
second alternative, which was considered by certain later historians as the reason 
why the Ottoman state was not successful in its “reform” efforts. Here, we can 
see the roots of ‘modernization paradigm’, which is largely based on the 
vakanüvis histories.8   
Lutfi Efendi puts a strong emphasis on the lack of discipline and 
organization of the Janissaries. Conventionally, historiography has argued that 
the Janissaries were the ultimate symbol of discipline and organization in the 
earlier days of the Ottoman Empire. When and how did this change? How did 
the Janissary corps come to be undisciplined? Was this an internal evolution or 
were the Janissaries actually never really disciplined in the modern sense of 
military discipline? The latter seems more possible because the military 
innovations and advance of the European states must have been the reason why 
the Ottoman state started viewing the Janissaries as backward in the eighteenth 
century and more intensely so in the nineteenth century. That is to say, the ideal 
Janissary image is probably a later fabrication of the Ottoman government to be 
                                                 
7 “…mütalaat ve efkarın fezlekesi iki neticeyi müeddi olmuşdur ki birisi yeniçeri namının 
bilkülliye mahvıyle yeniden nizamat-ı askeriyye tesisi...ikincisi yeniçerilik namı ortadan 
kalkmadığı halde Nizam-ı Cedid unvanıyla muntazam asker tertibidir.” Lutfi Efendi, p.8. 
8 According to this paradigm, the Ottoman modernization was the outcome of the struggle 
between the enlightened elite and the backward/corrupt military, societal, and religious forces in 
the Ottoman society. The foremost constructors of this model are Bernard Lewis and Niyazi 
Berkes. They argued that the Ottoman state was unsuccessful in its reform efforts because it 
continued to keep the old institutions. See Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of the Modern Turkey, 
London, 1961; Niyazi Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey, Montreal, 1964.  
 6 
able to argue that the Janissary corps was not “how it was supposed to be”. 
Therefore, their destruction proved to be an absolute necessity in that sense.   
 The last vakanüvis to be discussed in our study is Ahmet Cevdet Paşa. His 
account, titled Tarih-i Cevdet,9 presents the same type of accusations that had 
been put forward by the previous Ottoman historians. He accuses the Janissaries 
of terrorizing certain construction sites. In the example he gives, some lower class 
farmers and unskilled workers affiliate themselves with the Janissaries. Some 
Janissaries force the owner of the construction site to give them the money the 
laborers are supposed to receive. When they appropriate the wages of the 
construction workers, they give the workers only one half of the money and take 
the rest for themselves.10 This incident, which ends with a conflict between the 
laborers and certain Janissary soldiers and the following defeat of the soldiers, 
may be helpful to us in understanding the Janissaries’ ties to the workers. The 
Janissaries seem to have been involved in the disputes between the owner of the 
construction site and the workers. According to Ahmet Cevdet Paşa, the 
Janissaries’ involvement on the side of the workers meant terrorizing the 
construction site. However, their actions may very well be interpreted as efforts 
to protect the groups they had relations with. The official historian Ahmet 
Cevdet Paşa neither praises the efforts of the Janissaries to protect the workers 
nor criticizes the owner of the construction site for not giving the wages. Instead, 
                                                 
9Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, Tarih-i Cevdet, İstanbul: Matbaa-i Osmaniye, 1309/1893   
10 “Bir müddettenberu birtakım rencber ve amele makulesi mücerred garaz fasidlerini icra içun 
yeniçeri adadına dahil olarak bir binaya şuru iden müslim ve gayrimüslim gani ve fakir üzerine 
musallat olurlar...” Cevdet Paşa, p.32.  
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he uses the common accusative language of the Ottoman official historians 
against the Janissaries. Ahmet Cevdet Paşa does not focus on whether or not 
what the Janissaries did was wrong. Rather, the fact that this event caused 
disturbance is the main concern for him.  
 In Cevdet Paşa’s work we come across an interesting order of the Ottoman 
government, asking the Yeniçeri Ağası to provide the government with Janissary 
soldiers to fight against the rebels in Morea. In this order, the Ottoman sultan 
qualifies the Janissaries as “devoted, trustworthy, and well-known for their 
bravery”11 and asks for 5,000 Janissary soldiers to be sent to the Balkans in order 
to help the government to suppress the rebellion. The above-mentioned attitude 
of the Ottoman government towards the Janissaries is seemingly in contradiction 
with this decree. It is apparent that the Ottoman government was not able to 
raise enough soldiers from among the Janissaries during the Morea insurrection. 
This must have been one of the reasons why the Ottoman government changed 
the language it used towards the Janissaries in such a short period. The fact that 
the Ottoman government was not able to use the Janissaries as it wished seems to 
have coincided with the Ottoman government’s willingness to modernize the 
military. It can be argued that the real reason behind the abolition of the 
Janissaries was not basically their corruption or lack of discipline. Rather, it was a 
grander question that had a lot to do with the centralization and the 
                                                 
11 “…dergah-ı ali Yeniçerileri ocağ-ı devlet-i aliyyenin sadık ve mutemed ve şecaat ile meşhur 
ve esfar-ı sabıkada yüzlerinden devlet-i aliyyeye hıdmet eylemeleri gayretleri itizasından 
olduğundan naşi...” Cevdet Paşa, p.264. 
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modernization of the Ottoman central government along western lines. Whether 
or not Mahmud II really thought that the Janissaries had those qualifications at 
that time would not negate the argument here. The shift in the language seems to 
have resulted from the new policy the Ottoman state intended to pursue, 
regarding the Janissaries after they proved to be disobedient and disorganized 
compared to the European armies. The new modernization policy could not 
allow different centers of power to operate on their own. 
In a careful reading of vakanüvis histories, certain contradictions are 
apparent. While acknowledging the past strengths of the Janissaries and their ties 
with diverse segments of the society, there is no explanation as to why, how, and 
to what extent the Janissaries deteriorated, if they did at all, over time. 
Furthermore, connections between the Janissaries and the other groups in the 
society are described as harmful. Two major arguments, namely the deterioration 
of the Janissary corps and the harm caused by their relations with the society, 
have constituted our understanding of the Janissaries to a large extent. What the 
official historiography labeled as backwardness, corruption, and deterioration 
has to be re-examined from other angles by taking into serious consideration the 
role of the non-elite groups in Ottoman society.    
 
 9 
Modern Historiography 
In his monograph on the kapıkulu army12, I. H. Uzunçarşılı’s main focus is 
the Janissary corps as he considers Janissaries as the most important corps of the 
Ottoman central military power. His study provides vast information on the 
structure and the history of the Janissaries derived from the archival materials 
and the Ottoman chronicles. Yet, his descriptive account is composed of 
repetitions of virtually the same arguments provided by the Ottoman official 
historians and translations of the Ottoman bureaucratic documents concerning 
the Janissaries. 
Uzunçarşılı’s work is a typical example of the official view on the 
Janissaries that presented the Janissaries as a corrupt military institution that was 
once pure. According to him, the Janissary corps was a pure military institution 
at the time of its foundation, which managed to retain its character until the late 
sixteenth century. He underlines that especially in the eighteenth and the 
nineteenth centuries, the Janissaries lost their military effectiveness as a result of 
accepting unqualified men into the Janissary corps.13 In addition to that, 
Uzunçarşılı lists down the crimes committed by the Janissaries and the instances 
of corruption in which some important pashas and military commanders were 
involved. According to him, registration of ‘aliens’ by bribery into the corps, 
esnafization of the Janissaries, and the increase in the number of the married 
                                                 
12 I.H. Uzunçarşılı, Osmanlı Devleti Teşkilatı’ndan Kapıkulu Ocakları, 2 vol., Ankara, 1983. 
13 Ibid., p.477. 
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Janissary soldiers14 were the major reasons of the gradual deterioration and 
collapse of the Janissary corps.  
It is not possible to find an in-depth analysis of these causes in 
Uzunçarşılı’s narrative. For instance, why Uzunçarşılı calls these new elements of 
the corps ‘alien’ is not clear in his study. Does the term ecnebi15 (alien) mean a 
person from among different societal groups? Or, does it merely mean an 
untrained person? The registration of a new person into the corps should not 
necessarily have an adverse impact on the corps since the Janissary corps, as a 
military institution, must have had the necessary means to integrate a new 
person into its body and also to educate him.  
Uzunçarşılı argues that another important reason for the collapse of the 
Janissaries was the esnafization of the Janissaries. Uzunçarşılı assumes that the 
Janissaries were only soldiers who had not been involved in the economic 
processes beginning from the first centuries of the Ottoman Empire until the end 
of the sixteenth century. The ‘ideal Janissary’ according to the vakanüvis 
historiography, of which Uzunçarşılı is a consistent follower, should not have 
been involved in any economic activity. Such an idealistic typification of the 
Janissaries leads us to believe that the Janissaries were detached from Ottoman 
society for centuries and when they started to get involved in economic matters 
this caused their decline as an institution.   
                                                 
14 Ibid., p.478. 
15 Ibid., p.479. 
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The reasons Uzunçarşılı lists down may well indicate that the Janissaries 
became more and more involved in the social processes and they had merged 
with certain groups in the society. The so-called ‘esnafization’ of the Janissary 
soldiers and the integration of the ‘aliens’ into their corps can be interpreted as 
an indication of their ‘socialization’ as well. As their merging with different 
societal groups increased, the Ottoman government accused them of losing their 
capacities because of these connections. The classic explanation of why the 
Janissaries became ineffective in the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries is 
that the Janissaries engaged in the economic sphere and lost their real functions 
as a result of having close relations with the rest of the society.  
Furthermore, the Janissaries did not merely lose their original functions 
but they became the source of corruption and crimes. Uzunçarşılı gives many 
examples of the Janissaries’ misdoings. His accusations are meant to demonstrate 
how necessary it was for the Ottoman government to abolish this institution. 
That is why, the destruction of the Janissaries in 1826 was named Vaka-i Hayriye 
(the Auspicious Event). It can be argued that the official historians called this 
event ‘auspicious’ since the Ottoman state had taken an important step in 
destroying the social opposition against its ‘modernization project’. We may well 
assume that the Janissaries were, in fact, representing the social unrest against 
the new reform measures motivated by their social, cultural, and religious 
affiliations.  
 12 
The description of the Janissaries as a mere corrupt military faction is 
widely accepted in traditional historiography. Bernard Lewis’ account, which is 
rather a history of the Ottoman elite, on the modernization of the Ottoman 
Empire parallels the official view of the Janissaries. The different social groups 
and the dynamics they created in the society are not included in his study. 
According to Lewis, the Janissaries represented the backward institutions of the 
Empire. The Janissaries were the corrupt reactionary forces against the 
enlightened reformers. As the defenders of the status quo, the Janissaries 
collaborated with the ulema as well as the ignorant population of İstanbul in the 
revolt of 1807.16 In Lewis’ account, we find a strong rejection of any possible 
relationships with the rest of the society that the Janissaries may have had. In this 
context, the Janissaries appear as mere military people whose corruption and 
incompetence accelerated over time and who struggled against the reforms with 
the other interest groups to preserve their traditional power and status.    
Niyazi Berkes presents an account that is similar to that of Lewis but he 
recognizes the Janissaries’ links to other societal groups. Berkes’ study17 
acknowledges the social bases of the Janissaries and does not consider the 
Janissary corps as a mere military institution. However, the nature of these social 
connections is rather simple in his work. The Janissary corps became a tool for 
“impoverished esnaf (artisans, petty tradesmen, and men of odd jobs)”18 to use 
                                                 
16 Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, London, 1961, p.73 
17 Niyazi Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey, Montreal, 1964. 
18 Ibid., p.52. 
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the treasury of the Ottoman Empire. Berkes confines the Janissaries’ relations to 
the society to lower classes and he does not recognize even the possibility that 
they might have had more complex relationships with both the upper and the 
lower segments of the esnaf as well as of other groups.   
Berkes’ model is the same as Lewis’ in the sense that they both see the 
transformations in the Ottoman Empire as a struggle between the reformists and 
the conservatives. In this context, impoverished esnaf, the Janissaries, and the 
ulema together constituted the traditional forces against the modernization 
process of the Ottoman Empire. These forces were the reason why the Ottoman 
society was backward and that is why they had to be abolished. Despite the fact 
that Berkes acknowledges the Janissaries’ social connections, he maintains the 
general framework that was set out by the Ottoman official historians. 
The only monograph on the destruction of the Janissaries in 1826 is that of 
Howard Reed’s study on Vaka-i Hayriye.19 In his detailed account of the events 
that took place in Vaka-i Hayriye, he argues that Mahmud II did not intend to 
abolish the Janissary corps. The sultan’s main objective was merely to reform and 
to organize the Janissaries for the better. The destruction of the Janissary corps 
had more of a coincidental character according to Reed. The war with Persia in 
the east and the Greek insurrection in the Balkans convinced Mahmud II that the 
reform of the Janissary corps was indispensable.20 Reed opposes the idea that 
                                                 
19 Howard A. Reed, The Destruction of the Janissaries by Mahmud II in June, 1826, Princeton, 1951. 
(Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation) 
20 Ibid., p.3. 
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Mahmud II had formulated a grand plan against the Janissaries and argues that 
Mahmud II attempted to re-organize the Janissaries but their opposition against 
the implementation of the new reforms caused their destruction. In Reed’s 
picture, the destruction of the Janissaries seems almost accidental since the 
Janissaries might have survived if they did not oppose the new organizational 
changes. 
In Reed’s work, the focus is on the sultan and the military rather than the 
social or economic conditions of the Janissary corps. The same accusations set out 
by the official historians against the Janissaries are repeated in Reed’s work, as 
they are described as “terrorists”21. One of the important examples of corruption 
given by Reed is that the Janissary officers who had been sent to Jerusalem to re-
establish the order did not accomplish their mission, instead, they attempted to 
benefit from the existing chaos.22 According to Reed, these corrupt forces would 
not accept any change although Mahmud II’s intention was merely to re-
organize the military structure, such as in the Eşkinci (Eshkenji) attempt, rather 
than to offer a fundamental institutional change.23  
In this study, there is no discussion about the nature of the ties between 
the Janissary corps and other groups in the society. Reed’s main concern is to 
prove that Mahmud II’s aim was just to reform the military as a result of military 
losses in the wars at the time. Reed presents Vaka-i Hayriye as an event that 
                                                 
21 Ibid., p.42. 
22 Ibid., p.68. 
23 Ibid., p.51. 
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involved military men, pashas, foreign states’ representatives, the sultan, and the 
ulema. He refers to “public opinion” as an important factor determining Mahmud 
II’s cautious steps but public opinion never appears to be a real actor in the 
course of events. There is no mention of any social, cultural, or economic 
background to this event in Reed’s study.  His study is rather a descriptive 
narration than an analytical examination of the destruction of the Janissaries. 
 
Non-Traditional Historiography 
Although official and traditional historiography, which were based on the 
vakanüvis histories, are prone to describe the Janissary corps as an institution 
that was isolated from the rest of the society, there have been certain historians 
who addressed the relations between the Janissaries and the other groups in the 
society. We can call these historians non-traditional. Mustafa Akdağ is the 
earliest historian that can be included in this category.  
Akdağ’s article24, which was written essentially to criticize Uzunçarşılı, 
presents an interesting critique of the conventional historiography of the 
Janissaries. One of his strong points is that the social institutions should not be 
evaluated without reference to their inter-relations. He argues that abstraction of 
a single institution from other institutions with which it co-exists is the major 
problematic in Uzunçarşılı’s work. According to Akdağ, Uzunçarşılı misses 
                                                 
24 Mustafa Akdağ. “Yeniçeri Ocak Nizamının Bozuluşu,” Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve Tarih-
Coğrafya Fakültesi Dergisi, vol.5, no: 3 May-June 1947, (Ankara, 1947), TTK Basımevi, pp.255-352. 
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many important points because he isolates the Janissary corps from not only the 
other institutions but also from the rest of the Ottoman army.25 Thus, Akdağ 
makes a significant contribution to our understanding of the Janissaries by 
reminding us of their relationships with other institutions and drawing our 
attention to what we can call an ‘isolationalist’ approach in writing the history of 
a given institution.  
Akdağ also confronts Uzunçarşılı’s assumption of the existence of a 
perfect set of laws that was specifically made for the Janissaries. For instance, he 
questions the existence of a law that prohibited the Turks and the Muslim 
subjects from becoming a Janissary.26 Such a law did not exist according to 
Akdağ. A counter-argument could be made at this point because Uzunçarşılı 
introduced Kavanin-i Yeniçeriyan27 in his work as the source of the laws he 
attributed to the Janissary corps. However, Pal Fodor shows that Kavanin-i 
Yeniçeriyan should be considered as a nasihat-name28 rather than a kanun-name29. 
The author of Kavanin-i Yeniçeriyan must have written it to list down what 
he/she saw as the deficiencies of the Janissaries at the beginning of the 
seventeenth century as well as to suggest solutions to what he thought were 
                                                 
25 Ibid., p.292. 
26 Ibid., p.293. 
27 The author of this book is unknown but its date is 1606. Uzunçarşılı uses this source 
extensively. See Pal Fodor, “Bir Nasihat-name Olarak Kavanin-i Yeniçeriyan”, Reprinted from 
Beşinci Milletler Arası Türkoloji Kongresi: Tebliğler III. Türk Tarihi vol.1, İÜEF Basımevi, 
İstanbul, 1986. pp.217-224. 
28 A genre of writing to give advice to the state’s officials on different subjects.  
29 A code of laws or regulations. 
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problems.30 Uzunçarşılı uses Kavanin-i Yeniçeriyan as a source defining the 
regulations and laws according to which the Janissary corps was supposed to 
operate. Keeping Fodor’s remarks in mind, Akdağ’s challenge to the above-
mentioned prohibition seems to have derived from Uzunçarşılı’s method in 
using Kavanin-i Yeniçeriyan without questioning the nature of that source.  
The process in which the Janissaries spread throughout Anatolia and were 
increasingly involved in the economic activity dates back to the middle of the 
sixteenth century. The collapse of the timar 31 system in the mid-sixteenth century 
forced the soldiers to perform economic activities in Anatolia. The enormous 
increase in the number of the soldiers in the sixteenth century compared to 
fourteenth century made it impossible for the Ottoman government to pay the 
soldiers. Naturally, the Janissaries found other ways to sustain their livelihood. 
The economic conditions in the mid-sixteenth century, the Celali rebellions, and 
the rivalry between Süleyman the Lawgiver and Bayezid resulted in the 
stationing of the Janissaries in Anatolia as yasakçıs.32 It seems that it was not 
unusual to become farmers or shopkeepers while being a soldier since the 
soldiers were not able to live off the wages they were given. This eventually gave 
way to the merging of the Janissaries with the non-elite groups. As Akdağ 
shows, the involvement of the Janissaries in economic activities dates as early as 
the mid-sixteenth century. There does not seem to have existed any written law 
                                                 
30 Fodor, “Bir Nasihat-name…,” p.220. 
31 A fief acquired through a sultanic diploma, consisting as a rule of state taxes in return for 
regular military service, the amount of which conventionally was below 20,000 silver coins (akça).  
32 A person in charge of enforcing law. 
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apart from the testimonies of the official historians, stating that the Janissaries 
were not allowed to work and they had to come only from the devşirme33 system.         
Hamilton A. R. Gibb wrote about the links between the artisans and the 
Janissaries. In his well-known study with Harold Bowen34 he argues that the 
artisans in the Ottoman Empire were able to oppose the central or legal 
authorities. This contrasts the idea that the artisans’ corporations functioned as 
the government’s means to establish control and regulation over the artisans. 
According to Gibb, the artisans’ relative independence and influence on the 
administrative processes increased as their ties to the Janissaries intensified over 
time. The relationships between the two groups became so strong that almost all 
the members of the artisan corporations in the Arab cities like Cairo, Damascus, 
and Aleppo were either of Janissary origin or Janissaries themselves.35  
Gibb’s account is important in the sense that it provides a perspective that 
recognizes the different affiliations of the Janissary corps in the eighteenth 
century other than its military character. These affiliations were considered as the 
source of the ineffectiveness of the Janissaries by the official historiography. But 
in Gibb’s account, the Janissaries and artisan corporations appear as groups that 
represented popular resistance against the local and central authorities. In 
contrast to the official view that the Janissaries’ corruption and incompetence as 
                                                 
33 Levy of boys from Christian rural population for services at the palace or the divisions of the 
standing army at the Porte. For the historical development and functioning of devşirme system, 
see V.L. Ménage, “Devshirme”, EI², Leiden, 210-213. 
34 H. Gibb and H. Bowen, Islamic Society and the West; A Study of the Impact of Western Civilization 
on Moslem Culture in the Near East, vol. I, London, 1950. 
35 Gibb and Bowen, vol. I, p.280 
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a military institution derived from their merging with the other groups in the 
society, Gibb perceives the Janissary corps and the artisans as the agents of 
popular opposition.  
 Cemal Kafadar is the next historian who contributed to the literature on 
the Janissaries.36 His study is based on the secondary sources and he surveys the 
relationship between the Janissaries and the esnaf (artisans). He limits his work to 
İstanbul. Kafadar takes a different position compared to conventional 
historiography. He draws our attention to the diversity of the two groups and 
their multifaceted relations, adding that the nature of their relations ranged from 
“uncompromising solidarity to armed conflict”37. However, he argues that the 
Janissaries were affiliated with the “lower classes of İstanbul”38. Limiting the 
Janissaries merging with societal groups to only certain ones is debatable but 
Kafadar’s work is important in its effort to understand the complexity of the 
Janissaries’ social situation. 
Kafadar mentions the second half of the sixteenth century as the period 
when the Janissaries “began to acquire extra-military professions and merged 
with the civilian population of İstanbul.”39 As we learn from Akdağ, this process 
was identical with what was happening in Anatolia during the same period. 
According to Kafadar, this meant the degeneration of the Janissaries as well as 
                                                 
36 Cemal Kafadar, Yeniçeri-Esnaf Relations: Solidarity and Conflict, McGill University, 1981. 
(Unpublished M.A. Thesis). 
37 Ibid., p.2. 
38 Ibid., p.92. 
39 Ibid., p.49. 
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the formation of a new group.40 Kafadar seems to imagine a once-superior 
institution since he speaks of “degeneration”. To what extent this idealization of 
the earlier Janissaries reflect the historical realities needs further study of the 
earlier period. Yet, such an idealization has its own shortcomings since 
instutitions cannot present a unitary character at any given moment in history. 
The Janissary corps was subject to variations within itself at any given time 
period as well as to changes over time just like any other instutitution in the 
course of history. 
Kafadar presents a substantial critique of what we can call “corruption 
literature” in a later article41 arguing that the Janissaries’ image as soldiers who 
had no economic activities is a creation of later historians. He argues that the 
Ottoman viziers and even the rulers were involved in the economic sphere as 
early as the foundation of the Ottoman state and they were neither questioned 
nor criticized for their commercial activities. In this context, the Janissaries were 
allowed to engage in the economic sphere too.42 This short article is very helpful 
in understanding the Ottoman’s perception on the relationship between military 
and economic activity. It is clear that the Ottomans never drew a clear-cut 
distinction between the two. 
Donald Quataert contributed to the literature on the Janissaries by taking 
an interesting standpoint. He argues that the Janissaries represented the armed 
                                                 
40 Ibid., p.80. 
41 Cemal Kafadar. “On the Purity and Corruption of the Janissaries,” TSAB, vol. XV (1991), 
pp.273-279. 
42 Ibid., pp.275-276. 
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forces of the workers and the laborers in the Ottoman Empire.43 Quataert asserts 
that the abolition of the Janissaries was an attack against labor. Having 
eliminated the Janissaries, it was only after 1826 that the Ottoman government 
was able to impose its restrictions on the monopolistic priveleges that had been 
acquired by the urban guilds.44 Ultimately, Vaka-i Hayriye was one of the 
“hallmarks of further Ottoman integration into the world market.”45 We can 
confidently argue that the Ottoman government sought to destroy the privileges, 
which were acquired by different groups in the society through different means 
to establish a more centralized system. Quataert’s view is helpful in determining 
what the Ottoman state accomplished following the destruction of the Janissaries 
as far as economic groups were concerned. The new restrictions on guilds seem 
to have been a part of the larger transformation process from a decentralized 
system within which the existence of different centers of power was possible to a 
more centralized modern authority that would not come to terms with any 
fragmentation of power. However, interpreting this process as merely an attack 
on labor hardly gives the picture in its entirety. 
As for the social composition of the Janissary soldiers, Quataert seems to 
be under the very influence of the historical tradition that he criticizes. He 
                                                 
43 Donald Quataert. “Janissaries, Artisans and the Question of Ottoman Decline,” in Workers, 
Peasants and Economic Change in the Ottoman Empire 1730-1914, ed. Donald Quataert İstanbul, 
1993, pp.197-203. It should be noted that his research is limited to İstanbul and Aleppo in this 
article.  
 
44 Donald Quataert. “The Age of Reforms, 1812-1914” in An Economic and Social History of the 
Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914, eds. Halil İnalcık and Donald Quataert, Cambridge, 1994, p.768. 
 
45 Ibid., p.825. 
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acknowledges the idea that the Janissaries came from the “lower classes” of the 
society. In his writing, the phrase “the lower ranks of the working class”46 
sounds like the traditional historians who tried to show that the rebels in the 
Janissary uprisings were ignorant lower class people. Furthermore, reducing the 
Janissaries’ social roots to the workers is too simplistic given the existence of 
complex relationships between the Janissaries and the other social groups as the 
primary sources will show in the following chapters. His slightly different 
approach, which says that “these one-time professional soldiers had become a 
group who first of all were artisans and guildsmen and incidentally were on the 
military payroll”47 assumes that ‘these one-time professional soldiers’ were 
originally not involved in the economic activities. As Kafadar shows, historical 
data reveal that this was not true. Although they are not exhaustive elaborations 
of the Janissaries and their relations with the society, Quataert’s articles on the 
Janissaries provide us with a useful interpretation of Vaka-i Hayriye in a more 
general historical context as well as its impact on the urban guilds and its 
members. 
 
 
 
                                                 
46 Donald Quataert. “Social History of Labor in the Ottoman Empire,” in The Social History of Labor 
in the Middle East, ed. Ellis Jay Goldberg, Oxford, 1996, p.23. 
 
47 Quataert, “The Age of Reforms...,” p.764. 
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CHAPTER II: THE RELATIONS OF THE JANISSARIES WITH 
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND RELIGIOUS GROUPS 
 
This chapter will attempt to explain the profound relationships between 
the Janissary corps and different groups of Ottoman society through the use of 
hatt-ı hümayuns (imperial rescripts). The nature and format of these documents 
will be examined before proceeding to their analysis, as they have been used in 
this study extensively. Most of the documents in question date from 1826 to 1827 
and they concern the destruction of the Janissary corps, which took place in June 
1826. In this chapter, we will first focus on the use of these documents in terms of 
historiography as well as on the significance of these documents for the history 
of the destruction of the Janissaries. Then, we will examine hatt-ı hümayun 
documents in order to shed light on the relations between the Janissaries and 
other societal groups and to suggest a different approach to the destruction of the 
Janissary corps. 
The official nature of hatt-ı hümayun documents is fundamental in both 
understanding and using them. It was the Ottoman governors and bureaucrats 
who produced hatt-ı hümayun documents and this naturally determined the 
format as well as the content of these documents to a large extent. As for the 
format, in a typical hatt-ı hümayun document, one finds the summary of an event 
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or a problem and at least one possible solution suggested by one of the Ottoman 
bureaucrats. The report from a province occupies the largest space in a hatt-ı 
hümayun document. The Ottoman official gives a summary of the reports about a 
problem as well as the petitions from the localities48 and suggests a solution, 
stating that the ultimate decision would surely be up to the sultan’s opinion. 
Apart from this summary, it is possible to find separate petitions, recent 
developments in the situation, or additional information in the very same 
document since the Ottoman bureaucracy used the same paper during the whole 
process of corresponding and decision-making. And finally, the sultan’s decision 
concerning the situation is generally found in these documents. This format of 
hatt-ı hümayun documents allows the researcher to observe the process of 
decision-making from the very beginning until the end.49   
As for the content, hatt-ı hümayun documents reflect the official view of 
the Ottoman government. Finding public opinion in these documents can be 
indirectly achieved through a close reading of the texts. Yet, the researcher is still 
left with a vague impression reflecting public opinion since the reports were 
prepared by government officials and they had to be brief. In the documents I 
have analyzed, it is interesting to see how a problem could be reduced to certain 
                                                 
48 For the character of these summaries, see Pal Fodor “The Grand Vizieral Telhis: A Study in the 
Ottoman Central Administration 1566-1656,” Archivum Ottomanicum, vol. 15 (1997), pp. 137-188. 
49 In his examination of hatt-ı hümayuns of Murad IV, Rhoades Murphey argues that one can 
observe the different viewpoints of the bureaucrats as well as the negotiations that took place 
during the bureaucratic writing process of these documents. Rhoades Murphey, “An Ottoman 
View From the Top and Rumblings from Below: The Sultanic Writs (Hatt-ı Hümayun) of Murad 
IV (R. 1623-1640),” Turcica, Volume 28, 1996, pp. 319-338. 
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aspects and the reader is left with many questions about the content of the text. 
For example, in all of these documents, the Ottoman officials who reported from 
different regions have a similar, if not identical, approach regarding the 
Janissaries. They all argue that the Janissaries had been the source of misdeeds 
and they were terrorizing cities and provinces. What kind of harm did the 
Janissaries really do? What actions did the local governors label as terror acts? 
How is it possible that all the reports from localities, which were so far from each 
other, agreed on labeling the Janissaries as criminals? Were there no differences 
in behaviors of the Janissaries in regions as far apart as Damascus to Bosnia? 
How can one imagine that the Janissaries acted in one certain way in all the 
provinces of the Ottoman Empire? I believe that the analogous description of the 
Janissaries’ actions in the hatt-ı hümayun documents derives from the official 
character of the hatt-ı hümayun documents.  
A local governor’s audience was the central government and he was to 
apply the decisions made by that same government. Once the Ottoman 
government decided to abolish the Janissary corps, arguing that they had been 
troublemakers, the only thing left for a governor to do was to carry out the 
necessary actions. So, the testimony of a governor has to be read carefully and 
cannot be taken literally. It should also be recognized that a governor might not 
mention certain difficulties or realities in his district because that could have 
resulted in his dismissal by the central government for reasons of inefficiency. 
For instance, a common assertion by the governors in hatt-ı hümayun documents 
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is that they had been able to destroy the Janissaries and secure the obedience of 
the local population. This common statement has to be evaluated carefully, since 
historical data suggest that there were people who called themselves Janissaries 
in Ottoman provinces as late as the 1850s and that some regional rebellions 
lasted as long as seven years, as was the case in Bosnia. In brief, the researcher 
has to be aware of the official nature of hatt-ı hümayun documents and be 
cautious in accepting the reports as being an accurate reflection of reality. 
 
The Relations of the Janissaries with Economic Groups 
Historians of the Ottoman Empire have argued that the Janissaries started 
to be involved in non-military activities in the 18th and the 19th centuries, which 
caused the decline of this institution. Thus, they have assumed that the 
Janissaries were mere soldiers and did not engage in non-military activities. They 
also claim that the Janissaries terrorized the population and their destruction had 
become an absolute necessity. However, an alternative view is possible through 
the reading of hatt-ı humayun documents, which reveal the opposite.  
In the hatt-ı humayun numbered 17315, the governor of Damascus informs 
the Ottoman government that the Janissary rebellion in the Damascus district 
had been suppressed. The governor states that he had met with the public in the 
city center and warned/threatened50 them against supporting the Janissaries or 
                                                 
50 “…ve işbu ittifak-ı amme ve icma-ı ümmet-i muhammediyyeye mugayir söz söyleyen ve 
karşu duranların ber-muceb-i fetva-yı şerife şeran lazım gelen ceza-yı sezaları icra kılınacağını 
goş ve hoşlarına ilka ve telkine mübaderet...olduğuna...” BBA. HH. 17315, 1241 (1826). 
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claiming to be one of them. He says that the Damascenes had conformed and had 
gone back to their daily activities after this meeting. The daily activities he 
mentions are agriculture, trade, and artisanship.51 This referral indicates that the 
people working in these areas had been involved in the rebellion against the 
destruction of the Janissaries. Besides the support of the population, it can also be 
assumed that the Janissaries were conducting such activities since the governor 
threatens the Damascenes not to claim that they were Janissaries. As was the case 
in many provinces of the Ottoman Empire, an important majority of the local 
population, in this case the Damascenes, had rebelled against the decision of the 
abolition of the Janissary corps. Although we know that the Ottoman officials 
sent from İstanbul were successful in suppressing the Janissary supporters in 
Damascus, the composition of the people involved in the resistance remains 
significant. The rebelling forces in Damascus were not a clique of soldiers but a 
combination of different groups within the society. We can comfortably conclude 
that peasants, merchants, and artisans of Damascus were engaged in the 
opposition. Modern historiography would argue that this document shows the 
corrosion of the Janissaries since the Janissaries should not have been conducting 
non-military activities. Yet, the Ottoman government does not express any 
reaction to the fact that the Janissaries returned back to their daily activities. So, 
modern historiography’s assertion that the Janissaries were supposed to be mere 
                                                 
51 “…ve herkes ehl-i ırzlığı takınub kar u kesb ve ziraat ve hıraset ve ticaret ve sanatlarıyla 
meşgul olarak...” BBA. HH. 17315, 1241 (1826). 
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soldiers derives from their idealized reading of certain classic Ottoman 
chronicles, which describe the Janissary corps as a once perfect institution that 
deteriorated and became corrupt as a result of their affiliation with certain 
societal groups.  
The assertion of a strong relationship between the Janissaries and other 
economic groups in Ottoman society begs the following question: why did these 
groups support the Janissaries? We cannot completely answer this question. 
Nevertheless, one aspect of the matter can be assessed through our reading of 
hatt-ı hümayun documents. Hatt-ı hümayun records demonstrate that the Ottoman 
state banned the use of all Janissary titles.52 Some of these titles referred to the 
military ranks within the Janissary corps, whereas some of them were non-
military terms. An important example for the latter is yeniçeri yoldaşlığı (Janissary 
comradeship). Yeniçeri yoldaşlığı  is an interesting term in the sense that it does 
not refer to any military rank as the other titles do. The use of this term seems to 
be a means by which members of the other segments of Ottoman society could 
claim and establish relationships with the Janissaries. Having acquired such a 
title meant the protection of or affiliation with the Janissaries. In the documents 
we have examined, the Ottoman government strongly urges the state officials not 
to allow anybody to use these titles. This insistence upon the use of Janissary 
titles derives from the fact that different segments of the society had been able to 
                                                 
52 “…yeniçerilik namı ve anlara mahsus olan zağarcılık babası ve turnacılık ve düşman 
memalikde yeniçeri zabitliği ve serdarlık lafzı ve yeniçeri yoldaşlığı tabiri ve nişan duası 
külliyen ortadan kaldırıldığı herkese ifade ve tebyin ile…” BBA. HH. 17315, 1241 (1826). Also see 
“…yoldaşlık ve yeniçerilik namı lisana alınmayub...” HH. 17412, 1241 (1826).   
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escape from heavy taxation by the Ottoman government by using these titles. 
The Janissary titles meant tax exemptions for the small or large business owners, 
merchants, artisans, and guild members from both upper and lower classes. That 
is why, the Ottoman government sought to eliminate these privileges so that the 
state could subject different segments of the society to certain types of taxation. It 
can further be claimed that the more the Ottoman government laid taxes upon 
the Ottoman population the stronger the support for the Janissaries became. Yet, 
simplifying the matter by saying that the population supported the Janissaries 
merely for tax exemption purposes should be avoided since that would lead us 
to overlook the other types of connections such as the religious affiliations of the 
Janissaries.  
Despite all these efforts by the government to stop the use of Janissary 
titles, many people still used these titles even as late as 1835 in İznikmid, Kocaeli, 
and Hüdavendigar.53 One wonders why people were so resistant against the ban 
of the use of the Janissary titles. The hatt-ı hümayun numbered 17388 provides us 
with important clues about the significance of these titles. The author of the 
document recognizes that it will take some time for people to stop using these 
titles. He argues that the use of these titles derived from the fact that the people 
were inclined to be Janissaries. He acknowledges that it would not be possible to 
stop people from having these feelings towards the Janissaries; however, they 
                                                 
53 “...ağa ve bayraktar tabirlerini ... yalnız İznikmid ahalisi değil Kocaeli ve Hüdavendigar 
sancakları ahalisinin cümlesinde bu tabir cari olmakda...” BBA. HH. 17394, 1250 (1835). 
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could be controlled trough use of fear.54 It seems that the relationship between 
the Janissaries and the local people was more profound than a mere give-take 
relationship and it was imbedded in the local social fabric. 
Another important question concerning the relationship between the 
Janissaries and the population is how the Janissaries established links with the 
other groups? What were the means for the Janissaries to establish connections 
with the rest of the society? If they had to stay in their barracks how did they 
manage to come into contact with the local population? Although it is not 
possible to answer these questions fully, it can be suggested that kahvehanes 
(coffeehouses) played a significant role in the interaction between the Janissaries 
and the local population. In the hatt-ı hümayun numbered 19334, the governor of 
İznikmid (Kocaeli) informs the government that he had shut down a coffeehouse 
and jailed its owner since the owner had kept a symbol, which belonged to a 
certain Janissary group, after the official abolition of the Janissary corps.55 It is 
clear that this coffeehouse owner was resisting the government’s decision by not 
complying with the prohibition of the possession of Janissary symbols. It can be 
assumed that the coffeehouses, which were open to the public, also functioned as 
quarters for the members of that particular Janissary group prior to the 
                                                 
54 “...kaldı ki ahalinin birbirine eski tabiratı kullandıkları mücerred lisanları alışmasından ise de 
bu senelerden beri lisanları alışdığı gibi tabiatları dahi ol tarafa meyyal olduğuna şüphe 
olmamağla birden bire bu sevdadan geçirmek mümkün olamaz ise de aralıkda bu vechle taharri 
olundukça dudaklarına havf düşerek ıslah olmaları memuldür.” BBA. HH. 17388, 1241 (1826). 
55 “…İznikmid ahalisinden Gazi nam mahalde kahvehanesi olan Sofuoğlu Mehmed nam kimesne 
kahvesi ocağının fevkinde cam ile mahfuz ocağ-ı mülgadan kırk altıncının nişanı olan balta 
nişanını kaldırmamış ve camın uzerini kireç ile sıvayıp olvechle hıfz etmiş olduğu mitesellim-i 
çakeri müşahade eyledikde merkum Sofuoğlu Mehmedi ahz ve habs birle kahve-i mezkureyi 
temhir eylediğini...” BBA. HH. 19334, 1241 (1826). 
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destruction of the Janissaries. The coffeehouses must have helped establish links 
between the Janissaries and the population by serving as a public space for 
interaction. As a similar example, we learn from the hatt-ı hümayun numbered 
17381 that a coffeehouse owner in Edirne (Adrianople) was executed and his 
body was hung in front of his coffeehouse as a public display because he had 
openly criticized the abolition of the Janissary corps, resisted the government 
officials, and endeavored to revitalize the abolished Janissary corps.56 Moreover, 
many kahvecis (coffeehouse owners) are listed in the records of executed rebels in 
different regions.57  
These records also list the names of people from other professions such as 
pazarcı (dealer or seller in a marketplace), kutucu (box maker/seller), tacir 
(merchant), sabuncu (soap maker), kebabcı (seller of roast meat),58 fesci (fez maker), 
yemenici (headkerchief maker), kahveci (coffeehouse owner), yorgancı (quilt 
maker), külahcı (conical hat maker), kantarcı (maker of weights), doğramacı 
(carpenter),59 kasab (butcher), boyacı (painter), demirci (blacksmith), çizmeci (boot 
maker), tütüncü (tobacco maker),60 pastırmacı (beef-bacon maker), şişeci (bottle 
                                                 
56 “...turnacı kılkuyruk İbrahim nam habis ocağ-ı madumun mahv ve ilgasından dolayı halka ... 
kahvehanesinde bazı hezeyana ibtidar ... bunca yıllık ocak kalkdı yahud ve nasara içine çıkacak 
yüzümüz kalmadı diyerek ... kendisini ihkar içun tayin olunan adamımıza itaat etmeyerek 
hanesinden çıkmamış ise de ... şahs-ı mezbur idam ile ocağ-ı sabık gayretinde olarak 
zikrolunduğu vechile kahvesinde ... dercine yafta yazdırılub laşe-i mehusası üzerine vaz 
ettirilmiş olduğu ... ” BBA. HH. 17381, 11 Cemaziyelahir 1242 (10 January 1827). 
57 For a list of Edirne region see BBA. HH. 17402, 17 Cemaziyelahir 1242 (10 January 1827). For a 
list of İznikmid (Kocaeli) region see BBA. HH. 17496-B (no date); HH. 17335; HH. 17335-A; HH. 
17335-B; HH. 17335-C; and HH. 17335-D.  
58 BBA. HH. 17402, 17 Cemaziyelahir 1242 (16 January 1827). 
59 BBA. HH. 17493 (no date). 
60 BBA. HH. 17452, 28 Şaban 1242 (27 March 1827). 
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maker),61 and hammal (porter).62 The variety and diversity of people who were 
executed because of their support for the Janissaries clearly demonstrates that the 
support for the Janissaries did not come from a single group. How was it 
possible for the Janissaries to establish ties to groups as diverse as this? And, 
therefore, why are we emphasizing the importance of coffehouse owners rather 
than other professions in our attempt to find the means of establishing 
relationships between the Janissaries and other groups? The reason for this is the 
fact that coffeehouses were public places where, all groups of the society could 
assemble. The widespread involvement of the owners of these places in acts of 
rebellion reveals that the coffeehouses were the sites of interaction between the 
Janissaries and other societal groups.63 On the other hand, the diversity of the 
professions of the people who were executed indicates that the Janissaries’ 
interconnection with the society was not confined to a single group. In this 
context it should be acknowledged that it is unlikely that coffeehouses were the 
only places where the Janissaries and the rest of the society interacted. A broader 
study might uncover other realms and spaces for interaction. 
 
 
                                                 
61 BBA. HH. 17414-E (no date).  
62 BBA. HH. 17388, 1241 (1826). 
63 It is reported that more than 10,000 coffeehouses were destroyed in İstanbul. See Şamil Mutlu, 
Yeniçeri Ocağı’nın Kaldırılışı ve II. Mahmud’un Edirne Seyahati: Mehmed Daniş Bey ve Eserleri, 
İstanbul, 1994, p.25. It is very difficult to estimate how many coffeehouses were destroyed 
through our analysis of hatt-ı hümayun documents. Yet, it seems that the coffeehouses constituted 
a major issue for the government during the Vaka-i Hayriye events.   
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The Relations of the Janissaries with the Local Notables (Ayan) 
 Historiography has conventionally tended to reduce the relations of the 
Janissaries to the societal groups of the lowest classes of Ottoman society. This 
seems to derive from the fact that the Ottoman state rarely acknowledged the ties 
between the Janissaries and the ayan (local notables) in its official papers. Given 
that official historiography, and to a large extent modern historiography as well, 
has relied on these documents, it has been assumed that the Janissaries were 
related only to a small group of people from the lowest ranks of Ottoman society. 
The documents in hand reflect that the Ottoman state sought to isolate the 
Janissaries from the rest of the society and to deprive them of their social 
connections in order to break down their resistance against the central authority 
in its decision to abolish the Janissary corps. However, a careful reading of state 
documents reveal that at least some local notables supported the Janissaries in 
their struggle against the center. Moreover, the Ottoman state was quite sensitive 
to the probable support of the local notables and attempted to make sure that the 
local power groups would not ally with the Janissaries. 
 References to upper classes of Ottoman society, which supported the 
Janissaries, are found in some accounts of the official historians of the Ottoman 
state. These references are made in the form of accusations, yet, they 
acknowledge the connections between the two groups. In his Tarih-i Lutfi, 
Ahmed Lutfi Efendi accuses certain local notables of using the Janissaries for 
their own future ambitions, stating that the Janissary soldiers were not the only 
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ones who initiated rebellions. He condemns the notables’ support for the 
Janissaries and qualifies their actions as bad both for the society and the state.64 
Despite the fact that the official historians underscore the profound relationships 
between the Janissaries and the other groups, they occasionally mention the 
support for the Janissaries given by the upper classes of Ottoman society. 
 In hatt-ı hümayun documents, reporters from different provinces of the 
Empire inform the central government that they read aloud the decision 
regarding the Janissaries in the center of their locality before the ayan, ulema, 
and the Janissary soldiers. In the hatt-ı hümayun numbered 17315, for instance, 
we learn that governor of Damascus read aloud the decision publicly before the 
ayan.65 The hatt-ı hümayun numbered 17393 also states that the religious leaders, 
leaders of the Janissaries, and local notables were gathered in the residence of the 
local ayan to be informed of the government’s decision.66 Why did the Ottoman 
government attempt to ensure that the local ayan and other local power groups 
were informed of its decision? If the Janissary corps represented merely a 
regiment of soldiers and if the matter was solely military, why did the state feel 
the need to inform all the power groups in a province? This must have derived 
                                                 
64 “…ihtilal ateşlerini uyandıran yalnız ocaklı güruhu olmayıp ... bazı atabegan-ı garaz-pişeganın 
mirvaha-i talimiyyeleri eseri olduğu malumdur ... sebeb-i tecemmuları soruldukda istemeyüz 
sözünden başka şey bilmedikleri ... iki günlük ikbale devlet ve milletini değişmiş olan rüesanın 
ayaktakımını öne sürerek devletin ve halkın başına kopardıkları kıyametler ... kendilerine mucib-
i lanet olsa gerektir.” Ahmed Lutfi Efendi. Tarih-i Lutfi, vol.1, İstanbul, 1873, p.9. 
65 “…cümle vücuh-ı memleket mahzarında emr-i şerif-i alişan feth ve kıraat...” BBA. HH. 
17315, 1241 (1826). See also BBA. HH. 17315-C, 19 Zilkade 1241 (25 June 1826).  
66 “…sayir serdengeçtiyan ve alemdaran dahi ayan konağına celb ettirilerek yine ma nayib ve 
müftü cümle ulema ve meşayih-i memleket müctemi olduğu halde salifü’z-zikr fermannameleri 
gönderilib tekrar kıraat ve beyan ettirildikde...” BBA. HH. 17393, 25 Zilkade 1241 (1 July 1826). 
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from the fact that in many provinces the local powers had allied with the 
Janissaries and the government sought to prevent future rebellions as well as to 
end the rebellions that had already broken out.  
 Another hatt-ı hümayun shows that the support the Janissaries found in the 
provinces was not limited to lower classes. The local ayan of a neighboring 
district of Ayıntab supported them as the document reports. Moreover, the 
governor warns the central government that the Janissaries would resume their 
former rebellious and troublesome behaviours if the government chose not to 
press the ayan to deliver the Janissaries.67 There seems to have existed a 
possibility that the Ottoman government might not act against the ayan. Did the 
Ottoman government act more cautiously when the Janissaries were supported 
by the upper classes, contrary to its attitude when the Janissaries had the support 
of the lower classes? It can be argued that it was much more difficult and costly 
for the government to punish the local ayan than the lower classes for 
supporting the Janissaries. 
 The hatt-ı hümayun documents concerning the İznikmid region indicate 
that the Ottoman government was careful and occasionally hesitant in executing 
the local ayan because of their relationships with the upper classes of the 
Ottoman polity. Moreover, the local governors might even protect the members 
                                                 
67 “…eşkiya-yı merkume el-yevm maden-i hümayun müzafatından Behisni civarında vaki Hısn-
ı Mansur kasabasında mukim olup Behisni vücuhundan Murteza Beyin taht-ı himayesinde 
oldukları savb-ı senaveriye ihbar olunmağın...bunların itmam-ı karı teyhir olunduğu takdirde bir 
vakitden sonra bir takrible Ayıntaba duhule ferciyab olarak cibilliyyet-i asliyelerinde merkuz 
olan şekavet ve hıyaneti icraya başlayacakları...” BBA. HH. 17402-G, 23 Şevval 1242 (20 May 
1827). 
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of these local groups. In the document numbered 17496-A, the mutasarrıf (local 
governor) of the Hüdavendigar province inquires with the government as to the 
fate of the rebellious leaders in the İznikmid region. He mentions a local notable 
(ayan), Kurukahveci Hacı Ali, and some others, asking the government whether 
he should send them to the capital or if officials from the capital would come to 
İznikmid to take them.68 However, we find out in a follow-up hatt-ı hümayun 
numbered 17496-B that ayan Mehmed Ağa, who had been reported as a 
supporter of the Janissaries, is now reported to be a harmless person. The 
document provides the list of individuals to be persecuted, including Mehmed 
Ağa. However, the report qualifies him as an individual who had no relations 
with the Janissaries. It adds that he was a former member of the military masters 
in the Ottoman palace and the nephew of an Ottoman pasha.69 In contrast, the 
report specifies the social background of individuals who were not members of 
the local notables by naming them ayak takımı (people of the rabble).70 Thus, these 
two documents show that the local notables, who supported the Janissaries, 
might survive government persecution, depending on their relations with the 
                                                 
68 “…zikrolunan İznikmid ayanı ve Kurukahveci Hacı Ali naman iki neferden maada eşhas-ı 
merkumeden dokuz neferi bab-ı alilerinde olub İznikmidde icra-yı ceza-yı sezası için irsal 
olunacak merkum Sofuoğlundan başka dört nefer eşhas dahi daire-i çakeride mahbusen mevcud 
olmağla merkumların nefyleri için bab-ı alilerine mi irsali münasib görülür yoksa mübaşirleri 
savb-ı bendeganeme irsal buyurularak ahzları mı münasib görülür...” BBA. HH. 17496-A (no 
date). 
69 “…Paşa biraderzadesi ayan Ahmed Ağa yeniçerilikle alakası olmayıp mukaddema enderun 
ağavatı zümresinden ve ehl-i ırz güruhundan idüğü...” BBA. HH. 17496-B (no date). 
70 “…damadı karakullukçu Mehmed Ağa: ayak takımından olub Uzun eminin avanından idüğü 
Hırsovaya … kahveci İnce Ağa: merkum ayak takımından olub odun emininin avanından idüğü 
Köstenceye … nalçeci bayrakdar: bu dahi ayak takımından olub … Osmanın avanından idüğü 
idam…” BBA. HH. 17496-B (no date). 
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upper classes of the Ottoman polity. Janissary members and supporters from the 
lower classes were subject to harsher measures compared to the local notables 
(ayan).   
        
The Relations of the Janissaries with the Religious Groups  
  We know that the Janissaries had traditionally been associated with the 
Bektaşi religious order as early as the 16th century71 and they supported the 
Janissaries during the destruction of the Janissary corps. Bektaşis did not merely 
provide the Janissaries with ideological support; these two groups seem to have 
had profound organic relationships, which must have pushed the Ottoman state 
to make a radical decision as to the fate of the Bektaşi order. 
The hatt-ı hümayun numbered 17322 describes what the Ottoman 
government called ‘Bektaşi mischief’72 in İstanbul and Üsküdar. The reporter of 
the document complains about the inability of the government officials to 
prevent Bektaşi mischief despite orders by the sultan. According to this 
document, imams of the neighborhood and some people, who were 
knowledgeable and not ‘dangerous’, informed the government about the 
                                                 
71 Halil İnalcık argues that the reason why the Janissaries were affiliated with the Bektaşi order 
rather than Sünni Islam might have been that the Janissaries “tended towards the popular forms 
of religion” since they used to spend time with Turkish families in Anatolia for their religious 
and language training as a part of devşirme practice. Halil İnalcık, The Ottoman Empire; The 
Classical Age 1300-1600, London, 1973, p.194. 
 
72 “…Bektaşi fesadı...” BBA. HH. 17322, 1241 (1826).  
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continuation of the misdoings of the Bektaşis.73 It seems that the Ottoman state 
relied on Sünni groups in its effort to destroy the Bektaşi religious order both by 
using them as a source of information on the technical level and also by making 
sure that the highest official Sünni authority (şeyhülislam)74 sided with the 
government on the ideological level.75  
We also learn from this document that the efforts made by the Şeyhülislam 
supporting the Ottoman government’s decision on the abolition of the Janissary 
corps was not very effective in stopping ‘Bektaşi mischief’.76 The fact that the so-
called Bektaşi mischief continued even after the issuance of a fatwa by the 
Şeyhülislam indicates that the official religious justification of the abolition of the 
Janissaries did not readily find wide acceptance in the population. This raises an 
important question against the idea that the Ottoman population was fed up 
with the wrongdoings of the Janissaries and the Bektaşis. If that was the case, why 
did the Ottoman government have difficulty in convincing the population, as 
exemplified in this document, about the religious illegitimacy of the Bektaşi 
                                                 
73 “...gerek İstanbul ve gerek Üsküdar’da olan Bektaşilerin meşayih-i tarik ve ders hocaları ve 
meymur-ı şer vasıtasıyla mahlat imamları taraflarından ve sayir bigaraz erbab-ı vukufdan gereği 
gibi taharri ve tahkikiyle ....... ahval ve keyfiyetleri gadr u himayeden...” BBA. HH. 17322, 1241 
(1826). 
74 The Minister of the Canon Law of Islam. 
75 Some reports indicate that Bektaşi prayer sites (tekkes) were converted to Nakşi ones after the 
abolition of the Bektaşi order. See BBA. HH. 17351, 1241 (1827). Certain rival sufi orders seem to 
have benefited from the elimination of the Bektaşi order in return for their support for the 
government. 
76 “…Bektaşi maddesinin tahkik ve icrası hususu semahatlü şeyhülislam efendi dayileri tarafına 
bab-ı alilerinden işyar olun.. şayet itizar itmeleri veyahud taraflarından tahkik olunacakların 
hakkında mukaddema saray-ı hümayun-ı şahanelerinde iken kendülerine havale olunan 
Bektaşiyan haklarında olduğu misillü fakat kendülerinin vaki olan nutk ve takrirleriyle iktiza 
olunarak Bektaşilik fesadının yine külliyen ardı alınamaması melhuz idüğine...” BBA. HH. 17322, 
1241 (1826). 
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order? We can conclude that the Ottoman population did not support the 
persecution against the Bektaşis and that the above-mentioned support for the 
government from Sünni groups was limited to the government affiliated 
groups.77 
 The Ottoman government refers to Islam and its ehl-i sünnet interpretation 
as the source of justification for the abolition of the Janissaries and the Bektaşi 
order in hatt-ı hümayun documents. The Ottoman state sought to destroy the 
religious references of the Janissaries by the fatwas of Şeyhülislam. Certain 
şeyhülislams as well as imams that were Sünni supported the government’s 
decision. Yet, the opposition between Sünni and Bektaşi groups does not seem to 
have derived from a pre-existing ideological and religious conflict between the 
two groups. More than anything else, the main reason for the abolition of the 
Bektaşi order seems to have been their relationship with the Janissaries. It would 
be an over-simplification to argue that the religious zeal of the dominant 
religious group, the Sünnis, was the reason behind the decision to abolish the 
Bektaşi order.78  
                                                 
77 Uriel Heyd argues that the ulema not only supported the reform efforts but they were also 
involved in the destruction of the Janissaries. See Uriel Heyd, “The Ottoman Ulema and 
Westernization in the Time of Selim III and Mahmud II,” Reprinted from Studies in Islamic 
History and Civilization, Scripta Hierosolymitana, vol. IX, Jerusalem, 1961, p.64-65. See also 
Avigdor Levy, “The Ottoman Ulema and the Military Reforms of Sultan Mahmud II,” 
Asian&African Studies, vol. 7 (1971), pp.13-39. 
78 Butrus Abu-Manneh presents a class conflict analysis, which, he claims, existed between the 
Naqshbandi elite and the lower classes including Janissaries who were affiliated with the Bektaşi 
order. He overemphasizes the religious zeal of the ruling classes and seems to suggest that 
ideological as well as religious differences constituted the hatred against the Janissaries on the 
side of the ruling elite. See Ibid., pp.49-51. Although he recognizes the socio-political relations 
between the Bektaşis and the Janissaries in İstanbul as well as in other provicial centers, he 
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The Bektaşi-Sünni conflict does not suffice in answering the following 
question: why did the Ottoman authorities wait until the destruction of the 
Janissaries to abolish the Bektaşi order? Abu-Manneh argues that the Janissaries 
were traditionally the protectors of the Bektaşi order and the Ottoman 
government was able to destroy the Bektaşi order only after the Janissaries 
became ‘extinct’79. It is true that both the Janissary corps and the Bektaşi order 
were destroyed as a result of Vaka-i Hayriye events. However, the Bektaşi order 
was not the main target. Other groups were as much of a threat as the Bektaşis in 
different provinces of the Empire as well as in İstanbul.80 If they had not 
collaborated with the Janissaries, the Ottoman government would probably not 
have decided to destroy them as well. The documents used in this study reveal 
that anybody who supported the Janissaries ran the risk of execution or 
expulsion. Thus, the Vaka-i Hayriye does not seem to have occured out of a 
religious conflict. I would argue that it was more a result of a larger process, 
namely the modernization of the Ottoman government, which could not co-exist 
with independent or semi-independent power groups. 
                                                                                                                                                 
focuses his analysis on the opposition between the upper and the lower classes. He concludes 
that Vaka-i Hayriye was initiated by the upper classes and took its motivation from orthodox-
Islamic ideals, which were also supported by Mahmud II. See Butrus Abu-Manneh, Studies on 
Islam and the Ottoman Empire in the 19th Century (1826-1876), İstanbul, 2001, pp.183-184.   
 
79 By speaking of the extinction of the Janissaries, Abu-Manneh presents an İstanbul-centered 
view since we know that the resistance against the abolition of Janissary corps continued in the 
provinces for a long time. See Ibid., pp.67-70. 
80 “…bi’l-cümle eşraf-ı belde ve vücuh-ı ahali ve ulema ve meşayih ve ocaklu ve fukara ve zuafa 
muvacehelerinde ... ve kıraat ve ... meali dehayik-i münifleri tefhim ve ilan ve goş ve hoşlarına 
ilka olundukda...” BBA. 17412, 1241 (1826). 
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The hatt-ı hümayun numbered 17078 informs us about an Iranian Bektaşi 
called Haydar Baba, who was residing in the 99th regiment of the Janissary 
corps. The reporter says that he made sure that the head of the Janissary corps 
(Yeniçeri Ağası) understood that Haydar Baba was a spy from Iran and he should 
have been sent to Iran like the other Iranians (this might be a referral to some 
other individuals that were previously accused of the same crime).81 The same 
report says that some 40-50 Janissary masters (ustalar) questioned the above-
mentioned accusation and argued that Haydar Baba’s origin as an Iranian and 
the fact that the Ottoman state was at war with Iran were insufficient reasons to 
expel him. Since Haydar Baba had been residing within the Janissary regiments 
for a while and he was a Bektaşi, the Janissary leaders would not approve his 
expulsion and they demanded his release.82 The reporter says that the şeyhülislam 
had previously witnessed Haydar Baba’s close dialogue with the Iranian 
government ministers during his visit to Iran.83 It is also reported that the 
                                                 
81 “…geçen mevacib akabinde mübarek rikab-ı mülükanelerine semahatlü şeyhülislam dayileriyle 
… olduğumuzda doksan dokuzun kışlasında sakin İranlı Bektaşi Haydar Babaya dayir güzeran 
eden sohbet vechile merkumun İran casusu olduğu ve sayir İranlılar misillü İrana defi lazım 
geldiği yeniçeri ağası kullarına etrafıyle ifade ve tefhim olunup...” BBA. HH. 17078, 1230 (1815). 
82 “…Haydar Baba maddesi için kırk elli kadar ustalar ağa kapısına gelip sebeb-i nefyini sual 
ettiklerinde ağa-yı mumaileyh kulları dahi merkum sahih İranlı ve İranlının bu tarafa casusu 
olup el-halet-i hazihi İranlı ise devlet-i aliyye ile muharib olarak asker-i İslama kurşun atmakda 
olduklarından bu makule adamın Dersaadette bile durması caiz olmayub hususan padişah ocağı 
olan yeniçeri kışlasında ikameti bir vechile cayiz değildir ve böyle adama habs olunmak bir 
vechile münasib görünmez yollu vafir söz söylemiş ise de ustalar cevablarında bu adam İranlı 
olsa bile güya Bektaşi zinde ve fahrinde bulunmuş ve bir vakitden beri kışlada sakin olmuş 
olduğundan hakkında bu muameleyi tecviz etmediklerini ve fimabaad kışla derununda oturup 
katan taşraya çıkmamak üzere ıtlak ve iyadesi niyazları idügünü ifade ısrar eylediklerini...” BBA. 
HH. 17078, 1230 (1815). 
83 “…effendi-i müşarünileyh daileri bu Haydar Baba dedikleri herifi mukaddema kendileri 
sefaretle İrana azimetlerinde İran vükelasıyla muhallat eder olduğunu reyyü’l-ayn 
gördüklerini…” BBA. HH. 17078, 1230 (1815). 
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Janissaries continued their efforts to secure Haydar Baba’s release but the 
government stood by its decision, saying that the fatwa of the şeyhülislam, which 
is presented in the document as the representative of the opinion of Islam, was 
on the side of the government’s decision.84 According to the report, some cliques 
within the Janissaries invited some other groups to rebel against the expulsion of 
Haydar Baba but the majority did not join them arguing that one man’s 
expulsion would not bring the Janissary corps harm.85 As this document shows, 
the Janissaries respected and protected the Bektaşi leaders to the degree that at 
least some of them attempted to rebel against Haydar Baba’s expulsion. As the 
history of the Janissary corps is full of mutinies, another rebellion is not anything 
new. However, the expulsion, not even the execution, of a Bektaşi leader was 
enough to arouse a very strong resistance. It is virtually impossible to determine 
if Haydar Baba was really a spy or not. The Ottoman government may have 
taken this step in order to decrease the importance of the Bektaşi order for the 
Janissaries as well as to abate the power of the Janissaries by dividing them. 
More importantly, the analysis of this document demonstrates the apparent 
profound ties between the Bektaşi order and the Janissaries.  
                                                 
84 “...bu herifi istishab etmek şeran ve dinen cayiz değil imiş Kitabullahın ve şer-i şerifin hükmü 
böyle olunca bunun hilafı lakırdı söylemek elimizden gelmez siz dahi bildiğiniz ulemadan 
sorun...” BBA. HH. 17078, 1230 (1815). 
 
85 “...bu geceki odalar takımı eski odalılara haber getirip meclis-i cemiyetlerine celb ve davet 
dayiyesinde olmuşlar ise de eski odalılar biz böyle şeye karışmayız devlet bir herifi nefy etmeğle 
bunda ocağımıza ne zarar vardır deyu geri çekilmiş olduklarını...” BBA. HH. 17078, 1230 (1815). 
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As stated above, kahvehanes must have been the sites where the Janissaries 
and the Bektaşis met and socialized. However, as this document indicates, the 
presence of the members of Bektaşi order inside the Janissary regiments was 
another way for these two groups to establish and advance their relationships. 
The presence of Haybar Baba inside the Janissary barracks and the fact that this 
was considered natural, demonstrates that the encounter between the two 
groups was not limited to public spaces such as kahvehanes.  
This chapter has argued that the Janissaries were intermingled with 
different segments of Ottoman society. Their relations with the socio-economic 
and religious groups were far beyond temporary alliances. The members of the 
Janissary corps could conduct economic activity and this was not considered a 
new thing as conventionally argued by historians. Their relations with the ayan 
prove that the Janissaries were not associated only with the lower classes. And 
finally, they were also closely affiliated with the Bektaşi order. Kahvehanes seem to 
have functioned as one of the public spaces for the Janissaries for the 
establishment of their ties with the rest of Ottoman society.  
To conclude, I have argued that a close examination of hatt-ı hümayun 
documents reveals the interconnections between the Janissaries and societal 
groups. Thus, the established belief that the Janissaries oppressed the civil 
population seems to be unfounded. On the contrary, one could argue that one of 
the main reasons of the destruction of the Janissaries was these existing 
relationships between the Janissaries and the societal groups.  
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CHAPTER III: REACTIONS TO THE DESTRUCTION OF THE 
JANISSARY CORPS: COMPLIANCE OR OPPOSITION? 
 
In this chapter, we will attempt to understand the characteristics of the 
reactions of Ottoman society to Vaka-i Hayriye, with special references to the 
varied responses of the provinces as well as the capital. The questions this 
chapter will seek to investigate with regard to Vaka-i Hayriye and its implications 
are as follows: which provinces opposed the abolition of the Janissary corps? 
Who were the main supporters of the Janissaries? What kind of similar patterns 
can be detected in the provinces that rebelled? Which provinces complied with 
the government’s decision? What kind of methods were used by the state to 
secure the compliance of the local power groups?  
As the previous chapter has attempted to demonstrate, the Janissaries 
allied with and even represented various economic, religious, and political 
power groups within Ottoman society. When modern institutions were to be 
introduced, the Ottoman state could not carry out modern reforms as fully as it 
wished because of the pre-existing structures and the society’s unwillingness to 
adapt to new institutions. The resistance from different groups within the society 
made it difficult for the Ottoman government to implement these modern 
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changes.86 In this context, the Janissaries represented the interests of the socio-
economic groups they were aligned with. The modernization process was in 
contradiction with the relative independence of these groups. That is why, the 
abolition of the Janissaries, who had become the protectors as well as members of 
these groups, would mean that the Ottoman government could conduct reform 
efforts more easily. However, perceiving the Janissaries as the expression of the 
voice of Ottoman society at that time might be misleading given the fact that 
their resistance against the reforms could have resulted from the conflicts 
between different interest groups within the Ottoman state. In the end, they were 
still the soldiers of the government. It is crucial to understand this dual nature of 
the Janissary corps. Yet, it was their alignment with certain groups in Ottoman 
society that prompted the Ottoman state’s decision to destroy the Janissaries 
rather than a mere technical necessity to replace a corrupt army with a stronger 
one.87 
From the viewpoint of the Ottoman state, the Janissaries had become an 
institution whose actions were not predictable and determined. For a modern 
                                                 
86 For the discontent among the population in Anatolia against the reforms of Mahmud II, see 
Halil İnalcık. “The Nature of Traditional Society” in Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey, 
Ward, Robert E. and Rustow, Dankwart A. (eds.), Princeton, 1964, p.54. 
87 Avigdor Levy shows that Mahmud II incorporated the Janissary leadership into the newly 
established army (Asakir-i Mansure-i Muhammediye) but this new army did not achieve any 
significant success.  Avigdor Levy, “The Officer Corps in Sultan Mahmud II’s New Ottoman 
Army, 1829-1839,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 2 (1971), pp.21-39. This is in 
contradiction with the hatt-ı hümayuns, arguing that the replacement of the Janissary corps with a 
new corps was a prerequisite for the military success. 
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state, which sought to control and design every aspect of life88, this was not 
acceptable and that is why they had to be eliminated. However, as the hatt-ı 
hümayun documents illustrate, replacing the Janissaries with some other groups 
was a far less smooth process than it has been portrayed by conventional 
historiography. It can be observed in the documents that the abolition of the 
Janissary corps caused financial problems as well as social disturbances. Even in 
the compliant provinces, the Ottoman government had to negotiate with the 
local groups in an attempt to ease the reactions to the abolition of the 
Janissaries.89 
 
The Capital 
The destruction of the Janissaries in İstanbul did not arouse wide-range 
disturbance among the population of the city. The state was able to acquire the 
support of the higher ulema, certain Janissary masters (ağa), as well as the esnaf. 
As is revealed from various accounts of the Vaka-i Hayriye events, İstanbul 
witnessed an intense Janissary cleansing accompanied by the persecution of the 
Bektaşis, which does not seem to have taken a long time for the government to 
                                                 
88 Michel Foucalt discusses the disciplinary character of the modern state. He argues that the 
personalized nature of power in the pre-modern West took on an institutionalized character with 
the advent of modern institutions. These institutions sought to construct the society by 
organizing every individual. See Michel Foucalt, Discipline and Punish: Birth of the Prison, New 
York, 1995. These modern institutions were borrowed by the Ottoman Empire from the West 
during the 18th and the 19th centuries. It seems that the punitive character of the modern state had 
begun to operate in the Ottoman Empire, as the modern institutions were imported. 
89 Stanford J. Shaw emphasizes the reluctant attitude of the Ottoman government in introducing 
new military reforms during the reign of Selim III. See “The Origins of Ottoman Military Reform: 
The Nizam-ı Cedid Army of Sultan Selim III,” Journal of Modern History, vol. 37, Issue 3, (Sep., 
1965), p.297. 
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accomplish. Some of the Janissaries escaped the city but most of them were 
persecuted in Et Meydanı in Sultanahmed Square, a nearby area to the palace. 
Some Janissaries and esnaf seem to have obeyed the new decision because of the 
promise of the government not to cut their salaries and privileges. The higher 
ulema allied with the government but some medrese students seem to have 
acted in opposition.90 The relatively smoother process in İstanbul might have led 
some historians to believe that the Vaka-i Hayriye took a similar course of events 
in the provinces. 
 An analysis of hatt-ı hümayun numbered 17338 shows that the Ottoman 
government kept a hostile attitude towards the ex-Janissaries and Janissary 
affiliates in İstanbul even after the destruction of the Janissary corps out of its 
fear of a possible revolt. In this document, the palace kethüda91 reports that the 
head-butcher of the palace had informed him that some bostancis (gardeners), 
who were bringing meat to the palace, were ‘inappropriate men’. The reporter 
argues that these people had been causing existing ‘inappropriateness’ in 
Yedikule neighborhood. We also learn from this document that the palace took 
these people, whose number amounted to 120, to be Janissary and Sipahi 
(cavalry) soldiers prior to the abolition of the Janissary corps. The reporter 
concludes that there was no more need for these people given the fact that the 
                                                 
90 For the opposing attitudes of the higher and lower ranks of the ulema class towards the 
modernization efforts, see Uriel Heyd. “The Ottoman Ulema…,” p.70-73. 
91 Literally a ‘steward’. The steward of the establishment of the Grand Vizier was called kethüda in 
Ottoman bureaucratic terminology. Thus, this report was written by the office of the Grand 
Vizier. 
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Janissary corps was abolished and they should be exiled from the city. He adds 
that he could take over and handle the job of bringing meat to the palace, 
assuring the government that no problem would occur as to the delivery of the 
meat supply.92 The reporter cites some vague accusations against the ex-
Janissaries and asks the government to exile them. He does not mention any sign 
of rebellious acts by these people as a reason for their exile but says that they 
were ‘inappropriate men’. It seems that the government refused any tolerance 
towards any former Janissaries although they were not reported to be rebellious. 
One feels that the Ottoman government did all it could to free the capital from 
any individual who might have a tendency to rebel against the government in 
the aftermath of the Vaka-i Hayriye. 
     
The Provinces in Compliance 
The Ottoman government secured the compliance of the provinces 
through different means. In the hatt-ı hümayun numbered 17393, the governor of 
Erzurum El-Hac Salih Paşa says that almost all of the indigenous people and the 
                                                 
92 “…kasabbaşı ağa bendeleri kethüda-yı çakeri kullarına gelip vaki olan ifadesinde Yedikuleden 
saray-ı hümayuna et taşıyan bostancılar uygunsuz adamlar olub şimdiye kadar Yedikuleden 
zuhur eden uygunsuzluklar bütün bunlar neşyet edegelmiştir ve bunların bazan seksen ve bazan 
yüzyirmi nefer kadar olub kendi beynlerinde bir kolu yeniçeri ve bir kolu sipah olarak eskileri bir 
sene yeniçeri ocağı ve bir sene sipahi ocağı tarafından bölükbaşılıkla cerağ olagelmişler ise de el-
halet-i hazihi bu ocaklar madum ve mülga olmakla işleyecek tarikleri dahi kalmayıp bunların 
hizmetleri ... saray-ı hümayunun ve sayir bazı ashab tayinatının tayinlerini taşımaktan ibaret ve 
saray-ı hümayun tayinatı taşımak kasabbaşıların fariza-i zimmetleri olmağın ben kendi 
adamlarımla taşıtırım ... bunların katan lüzumları olmadığından ... ve ol makule eşhas 
takımından ol mikdarın değil bir tanesinin bile bırakılması cayiz olmayarak ... dersaadetten def 
ve tedibleri cihet-i lüzumlarından ziyade elzem ve enfa olduğu bedidar olmağın...” BBA. HH. 
17338, Rebiyülevvel 1242 (October 1826). 
 49 
local notables were Janissaries in the Erzurum region.93 The reporter assures the 
government that he knew from his experiences that most of these people were 
trustworthy and obedient to the sultan.94 However, the same document shows 
that the local governor had to gather the local notables and religious leaders to 
explain to them the important reasons why they should comply with the 
government’s decision. The local governor reports that he told these people in a 
meeting in his residence that the Russian and Iranian threat in the East would 
require the Ottoman government to have soldiers that were capable of 
responding to the enemy in the battlefield as described by the Quran. According 
to his testimony, the people who were present acknowledged the need of the 
government for such qualified soldiers.95 At first glance, the document describes 
a smooth process in which the local governor and the local groups agreed that 
the replacement of the Janissary corps with new soldiers was appropriate. The 
question to be raised here is: why did these local power groups accept the 
government’s decision whereas they were Janissaries themselves? The answer is 
                                                 
93 A whole population of a single region carrying Janissary titles does not seem to be a rare 
instance. For a similar situation in Bosnia in the mid-eighteenth century, see Bruce McGowan. 
“The Age of Ayans, 1699-1812,” in H. İnalcik and D. Quataert, eds., An Economic and Social History 
of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914, Cambridge, 1994, p.665.   
94 “…Erzurum vücuh ve ahalisinin heman mecmuu kavi yeniçeriden ibaret ise de ekseren ehl-i 
ırz ve muti ve padişah kulluğunu iltizam etmiş oldukları bi’t-tecarib malum-ı çakeri 
idüğünden...” BBA. HH. 17393, 25 Zilkade 1241 (1 July 1826).  
95 “…evvela nayib ve müftü ve ayan ve sayir birkaç münasibi celb ve keyfiyyet ifade ve istişareden 
sonra müderrisin ve ulema ve meşayih-i belde ve ocaklı agavat ve serdengeçti tabir 
olunanlardan bazısının ve ihtiyarları nezd-i bendegiye getürdülüb bir zamandan berü düşman-ı 
din-i muhammedinin galebesinden bi’l-husus bu esnada Rusyalının ve diğer arıza-i çakeride 
mübeyyen olduğu üzere İranlının bazı harekatından iktizasına göre bahs ve cihadda mukabele-i 
bi’l-misle müteallik Kuryan-ı Kerimde mensus ayet-i kerime tezkar ile bu suretde devlet-i 
aliyyeye düşmana cevab vermek için işe yarar muallem askerin lüzumu ve gayr-i lüzumu suyal 
olundukda elzem idüğü iytiraflarından sonra...” BBA. HH. 17393 25 Zilkade 1241 (1 July 1826). 
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found in the very same document which reveals that the local governor 
promised them that their salary payments as Janissaries would not be disrupted. 
Moreover, the governor promised them that the Janissary leaders (ağa) who had 
previously served in the military campaigns and some others would be awarded 
by the sultan with certain titles.96 Therefore, it is clear that the Ottoman 
government used it as a method to give government positions to the individuals 
in important positions in order to ease the reactions and acquire the compliance 
of the local power groups.97  
In a petition sent to the sultan by the local ayan and ulema of the same 
region, Erzurum, the local power groups state their compliance with the decision 
of the Ottoman government. What is interesting about this petition is that it was 
written after the meeting between the governor and the local groups. That is, the 
local groups did not take initiative to write a petition to the sultan independently 
of the local governor. The phrase “it was preached into our ears that those who 
have the miniscule amount of comprehension and reason would obey the 
decision”98 leads us to believe that the governor’s tone was not very pleasant at 
                                                 
96 “...herkesin mutasarrıf olduğu maaşına müdahale yokdur ve seferlerde emek vermiş ağalar ve 
sayir iktiza edenlerin saye-i hazret-i padişahide aher rütbeleriyle taltifi mümkündür yollu avam-
pesend olacak bazı kelimat dahi taraf-ı çakeriden beyan ve nusuh ve pende mübaderet 
olunmağla cümlesi izhar-ı itaat ve inkiyad ile bila-tereddüd ve kıl ü kal-i irade-i behiyyeyi ez dil 
ü can kabul etmiş...” BBA. HH. 17393 25 Zilkade 1241 (1 July 1826). 
97 The Ottoman government used similar tactics during the reign of Selim III by promising the 
ayan continuation of their privileges. See Deena R. Sadat, “Rumeli Ayanlari: The Eighteenth 
Century,” Journal of Modern History, vol. 44, Issue 3 (Sep., 1972), p.362.   
98 “…Erzurumda mütemekkin bi’l-cümle ulema ve saliha ve ... ve ayan ve eşraf ve yeniçerilik 
nam ve şiyarından rugerdan olarak fermude-i devlet-i aliyyeye gerdandade-i itaat olan ağvat 
kullarının arz-ı mahzar sıdk-ı hakikat müesseseleridir ki...zerre kadar akl u izanı olan kimesne 
ferman-ı kaza ceryan-ı şahaneye itaat ve inkıyad eylemesi vezir-i müşarünileyh hazretleri 
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their meeting. These meetings between the central government’s representatives 
and the local powers seem to have taken different forms, in terms of the nature of 
the conversations. In some cases, the government publicly threatens the local 
powers and proceeds to apply the decision, demonstrating its absolute power. In 
some other cases, the government negotiates with the local powers promising 
them titles. Different forms of acquiring compliance were determined by the 
particularities of a given locality. One can also see the fearful and hesitant 
language of the hatt-ı hümayuns when they concern certain regions that are 
known to be the supporters of the Janissaries. This proves that the Vaka-i Hayriye 
was not a smooth process for the government. This threat by the state seems to 
have coexisted with the above-mentioned promises not to alter the existing 
situation.     
It seems that people in the Erzurum region had their reasons to abide by 
the abolition of the Janissaries. On the one hand, they seem to have avoided 
acting in a way that would benefit the enemy, namely Russia and Iran at that 
time. On the other hand, the promises made by the government must have 
alleviated their worries about their privileges acquired through the Janissary 
titles. Although it is difficult to judge if these promises were more or less 
effective than the threats, both seem to have been tools for the government to 
secure the compliance of the province. Whether or not the local groups would 
                                                                                                                                                 
tarafından goş ve hoşlarımıza ilka ve telkin buyuruldukda...bundan sonra ferman-ı ali 
mantukunca hareket olunacağı...işbu mahzar-ı acizanelerimiz ile arz ve ifade olundu...” BBA. 
HH. 17315-B, 1241 (1826). 
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rebel against the state if the Ottoman government did not make promises or if 
there did not exist Iranian and Russian threats is open to speculation. However, 
we know from the examples of other provinces in the Empire that local people 
did rebel at times when they thought they would lose their privileges or they 
would have to pay more taxes. The Ottoman government offered the 
continuation of the privileges acquired through affiliation with the Janissaries in 
order to reduce the social unrest in the provinces. Thus, the example of Erzurum 
illustrates well that the Ottoman government had to negotiate99 with the local 
power groups in order to apply the decision concerning the abolition of the 
Janissary corps, even in regions that were known to be compliant with the central 
government.    
The hatt-ı hümayun numbered 17475-I provides us with an idea about what 
kind of hostility against the Janissaries existed and how it operated around the 
time of Vaka-i Hayriye events. The governor of Vidin, İbrahim Paşa, complains 
about certain Janissary officers who had been exiled from their provinces to 
Vidin after the Vaka-i Hayriye. The governor reports that these Janissary exiles 
                                                 
99 The local governor seems to be pleased with the result of the secret negotiations. See 
“...Erzurum ve mahall-i sayirede dahi yeniçeri zabiti yedinde olan kala miftahı ve sayir rüsum-ı 
beldenin fimabaad vülat tarafından ruyyeti irade kılınmış olduğundan...iktiza eden bazı efendile 
hafice celb ve istişare olunup badehu yeniçeri ağası mazulleri ve alemdaran ve serdengeçtiyan 
ve sayir ağavat celb ve kimsenin esami ve yevmiyyesine halel gelmeyeceği ve sayir keyfiyyet 
delailiyle kendilerine ifade ve bu babda emr-i devlet-i aliyyeye imtisal haklarında mucib-i hayr 
olacağı telkin ve tefhim olunarak emrname-i mezkur sureti dahi kıraat ettirildikde içlerinden 
bazıları ima-yı tereddüd eder gibi olumşlar ise de li’l-lahi’l-hamd semere-i tevcihat-ı aliyyeleri 
meclis-i vahidde iskan olunarak cümlesi kabul...” BBA. HH. 17331, 6 Cemaziyelevvel 1241 (17 
December 1825). See also “ilga olunan yeniçeri ocağından esami mutasarraflarının ulufeleri 
kemakan ita olunması hususuna inayet-i aliyye-i şahane taalluk edib...” BBA. HH. 17332, 
Rebiyülevvel 1242 (October 1826).  
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had not exhibited any misdeeds. The governor acknowledges that their stay in 
Vidin did not create a problem or inconvenience. Yet, he asks the government to 
send these officers back to their own regions because “they seem like pigs in a 
flock of sheep.”100 One can easily see that the governor is disturbed not because 
of a crime committed by these Janissaries101 but because of their mere presence in 
his district. It can be argued that the Janissaries were feared as a result of their 
previous crimes. However, as we clearly see in this document the governor does 
not complain that these Janissaries may do evil acts. He complains that they have 
an image of pigs in a flock of sheep. It seems that the governor is disturbed by a 
possibility of support for the Janissaries (pigs) by the local population (sheep). 
We can assume that the governor had in his mind the popular revolts in other 
regions and he feared a possible revolt triggered by the Janissaries against his 
authority. This document shows us that reports from the provinces cannot be 
taken literally since the prejudices and censorship of the local authorities were 
involved to a large extent. It is revealed in this document that there existed a 
fragile atmosphere in Vidin, a region where the compliance of the population 
had already been assured.     
Amasya seems to be a province where the government did not have much 
difficulty in applying its decision. In a hatt-ı hümayun numbered 17405-G, 
                                                 
100 “…Vidine geleli ... defterde isimleri tasrih olunan birkaç odabaşı vareste olarak bulunanlardan 
bir su-i hareket müşahade itmemiş isem de ve bunların bade’l-yevm Vidinde eğlenmelerinde 
zerre düşme bais ve mahzur bulunmasa da ehl-i iman arasında keennehu koyun sürüsünde 
donuz kerez gibi barid görünmeleriyle vilayetleri tarafına def olunmaları münasib ise ... savb-ı 
işyara himmet buyurmaları milletimin senaveridir efendim.” BBA. HH. 17475-I (undated) 
101 For the names of these individuals see BBA. HH. 17475-A, 11 Zilhicce 1241 (17 July 1826). 
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religious leaders of Amasya region state their submission to the state’s decision. 
In their writing, they promise that Muslims and members of Janissary corps 
would unite as brothers of Islam from now on. They also refer to the order of the 
central government, carrying the ‘advise’ to obey the decision on the abolition of 
the Janissary corps.102 This relatively short submission is far from presenting an 
accurate picture of the situation in Amasya. It is difficult to determine what kind 
of negotiations went on in Amasya. However, we see that the petitioners’ 
promise to unite might imply that there existed a fragmentation among some 
local groups and the Janissaries. His reference to unification as Muslim brothers 
might indicate that there existed a religious tension between the local ulema and 
the local Bektaşi groups because of the abolition of the Janissaries. Neither the 
existence nor the character of such an opposition is present in this document.  
The above-mentioned petition makes a distinction between the people of 
Amasya and the Janissaries before the abolition of the Janissary corps. However, 
such a clear distinction between the local people and the Janissaries must have 
derived from the desire to present a smooth picture.103 The willingness on the 
                                                 
102 “…Amasyada sakin ulema ve ... eyimme ve huteba ve sadat-i kiram-ı zulihtiram ve bi’l-cümle 
vücuh ve hanedan ve fukara ve zaifanın ala tariki’l-mahzar arz-ı hal-i eserleridir ki ... bundan 
böyle mecmu-i ehl-i islam ve sayir ocaklar halkı bir vücud gibi olub birbirlerine din karındaşı 
nazarıyla bakarak miyanelerinde ayrılık ve gayrılık olmamak ... ve sayir tenbihat-ı seniyyeyi 
muhtevi hala Sivas valisi devletli es-seyyid Mehmed Paşa hazretlerine ve Tokad naibi ve Amasya 
naibine va sayir kullarına hitaben şerefriz-i südur buyurulan ferman-ı alişanın ... cümleye ilan ve 
işaat olundukda hepsi itaat ve buna göre hareket edeceklerini bildirmiş...” BBA. HH. 17405-G, 
Zilhicce 1241 (July 1826). 
103 The reports from Selanik (Salonica) and Kars present similar smooth pictures. For Selanik, see 
“…bu defa canib-i çakeriye ve sayire hitaben şeref bahşa-yı sadır olan bir kıta ferman-ı cihan-
muta mübaşir-i dergah-ı ali gediklilerinden Abdullah Ağa kullarıyla lede’l-vürud imtisalen bi’l-
cümle eşraf-ı belde ve vücuh-ı ahali ve ulema ve meşayih ve ocaklı ve fukara ... okunup manası 
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part of the petitioners to present a relatively smooth picture is a common pattern 
seen in hatt-ı hümayun documents. Although there does not seem to have occured 
wide-range social disturbances in Amasya, it is difficult to conclude that there 
was no resistance at all. The so-called unification of the local people must have 
required the submission of the non-compliant forces to the new order.  
In the hatt-ı hümayun numbered 17389, an official of the Ottoman 
government sent from the capital reports the results of his inspections in certain 
regions in Anatolia. He says that he neither saw inappropriate men nor heard the 
banned words, such as beşe and bayrakdar, in Ankara. He says that he did not 
witness any conversations against the abolition of the Janissaries in the market 
place in Kayseri. In the town of Develi, he reports, where people were mostly 
former Janissaries, he did not witness any bad conversations either. He goes on 
to repeat the same thing for Niğde. In Konya, the official walked around with the 
soldiers appointed by the center to find that nobody used bad words against 
them. Lastly, in the village of Kilisehisar in Yenişehir, he did not witness any bad 
words against the government when he visited a kahvehane (coffeehouse), despite 
the fact that the residents of the village had been exiled from İstanbul.104 It seems 
that the Ottoman government conducted policing activities in the aftermath of 
the Vaka-i Hayriye. The state sought to ensure that there was no underlying 
                                                                                                                                                 
anlatılıp ve hepsi itaat edip bellerinde olan çaprazları çıkartıp teslim etmişler sonra kışlalarında 
ve sayir yerlerde olan kazanlarını ve sayir eşyalarını mutasarrıfa teslim etmişler...” BBA. HH. 
17412, 9 Zilhicce 1241 (15 July 1826). For Kars, see “…yeniçerilerin ilgasına dayir ferman Kars’da 
ahaliye okunduğunda herkesin itaat ettiğini yeniçerilere aid edavatın alınıp deftere kaydedilerek 
kale cephanesine konduğunu...” BBA. HH. 17343, 29 Muharrem 1242 (2 September 1826).   
104 BBA. HH. 17389, 21 Muharrem 1243 (14 August 1827). 
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opposition to the state as a result of the abolition of the Janissaries. The accuracy 
of the report used here can be examined in a separate study. More importantly, 
the efforts of the central state to ensure the establishment of central authority is 
clearly exemplified in this document.   
 
The Provinces in Opposition 
 The destruction of the Janissary corps resulted in rebellions of the local 
populations throughout the Empire. The hatt-ı hümayun numbered 17402 shows 
that the Edirne (Adrianople) region witnessed widespread mutinies supported 
by all segments of society. The local governor reports that there were too many 
Janissaries in Edirne who would cause ‘mischief’. He adds that these people were 
being searched for in a meticilous manner all over the region.105 He also states 
that especially tanner workshops (debbağhanes) were being searched for and there 
was a need for stationing soldiers in these places.106 This document is 
particularly interesting since it shows that tanners were supporting the 
Janissaries in the Edirne region. Furthermore, their workshops had become 
dangerous places in the eyes of the government, as they could provide the 
Janissaries with means to organize their efforts to resurrect the abolished corps.  
                                                 
105 “…Edirnede fesad çıkaracak yeniçeri tayifesinden haylice adam olduğundan ihmal 
gösterilmeyip bunların köşe bucak arandığı...” BBA. HH. 17402, 17 Cemaziyyelahir 1242 (16 
January 1827). For the list of people who were exiled or killed by the local governor, see BBA. 
HH. 17493 (no date). The lists in these two documents demonstrate the large scale of the 
rebellion. 
106 “…debbağhaneler mecma-ı mefsed olduğuna binayen ahalinin kefalete rabtı iradesi bi lutf’i-
llahi teala hitamına değin debbağhanelere asker ikamesi münasib-i vakt ü hal olacağından...” 
BBA. HH. 17402, 17 Cemaziyyelahir 1242 (16 January 1827). 
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The İznikmid region seems to be one of the most troublesome regions for 
the Ottoman government. As the hatt-ı hümayun 17335 shows, certain 
coffeehouse owners, the leaders of the local notables, and even a government 
official continued to claim to be Janissaries in 1827.107 Their opposition to the 
abolition of the Janissary corps was not individualized. As the hatt-ı hümayun 
17335-A reveals, these individuals represented a wider threat for the 
government. The reporter pleads that the sultan should not execute these 
individuals for the time being until the government manages to arrest another 
coffeehouse owner, Ali Fevzizade. The reporter’s reasoning is that the execution 
of these individuals might result in a widespread revolt in the region that would 
be triggered by Ali Fevzizade.108 This document is an example of the 
government’s hesitation in persecuting the rebels in its efforts to suppress the 
rebellion out of fear of a more far-reaching rebellion. 
An analysis of a hatt-ı hümayun concerning the Ayıntab region in the 
eastern province of Maraş indicates that the cleansing of Janissary members took 
more than six months109 and the indigenous people allied with the Janissaries 
and continued their support even after the defeat of the Janissaries by providing 
                                                 
107 “...kahveci Sofuoğlu Mehme nam şahıs ... merkum Sofuoğlu Mehmed’den başka İznikmid 
vücuhundan diğerleri ve İznikmid ayanı va hattab emininin dahi yeniçerilik gayret-i batılasında 
oldukları...” BBA. HH. 17335, 1242 (1827). 
108 “…kerem-i inayet edip hakipaya varan adamlara şimdilik gazab etmeyesin efendim ta ki 
kurukahveci Ali Fevzizade Hacı Ahmed Ağayı hakipaya getirtmedikçe sakınıp gazab etmeyesin 
zira Ali Fevzizade gayet müzevvirdir memleketi bir ihtilale vermesin hal-i fesadını bilir erbab-ı 
vakıfın zannları böyledir...” BBA. HH. 17335-A, 1242 (1827). For the correspondence between the 
local governor and the central government about these individuals, see BBA. HH. 17335-B, 1242 
(1827); 17335-C, 3 Zilhicce 1242 (28 June 1827); 17335-D, 3 Zilhicce 1242 (28 June 1827).  
109 The date of this petition is 31 January 1827. The abolition of the Janissary corps was in June 
1826. 
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them lodging and helping them escape. In the hatt-ı hümayun numbered 17399, 
the wali (viceroy) of Maraş reports that he entered in Ayıntab with a lot of 
soldiers to wipe out the Janissary rebels. He says that there was resistance at the 
beginning but he was able to crush the resistance and the Janissaries escaped the 
town. The viceroy also mentions the difficulties he had faced, namely the 
exhaustion of his soldiers and animals.110 The executions of Janissary leaders and 
their supporters seem to have followed the repression of the rebellion as an 
example for the people who might intend to betray the state by not obeying its 
orders.111 Yet, it seems that these executions could not prevent at least some of 
the local groups from supporting the Janissaries. According to the document, the 
viceroy ordered the arrest of the Janissaries who had fled to the regions in the 
east of Ayıntab, such as Nizib, Nizar, and Birecik.112 In spite of this order, the 
Janissaries seem to have found refuge in the town of Birecik whose population 
had previously been members of the Janissary corps. The Janissaries stayed in 
the town of Birecik for three days and then they went to the province of Rakka 
with the help of the people of Birecik. The viceroy concludes that the people of 
Ayıntab had been saved from the Janissary suppression and order had been 
                                                 
110 “…Ayıntabda bulunan yeniçerilerin temizlenmesi için daire halkı ve çok sayıda askerle 
Ayıntaba gelen Paşanın kuvvetlerine ilk başta direniş gösterip çatışmaya giren yeniçeriler daha 
sonra tutunamayıp firar etmişler...asker ve hayvanat-ı mevcudemiz bi-tab olmuş ise de 
hayvanatın adem-i kudret ve yorgunluğuna bakılmayarak...” BBA. HH. 17399, 3 Receb 1242 (31 
January 1827). 
111 “…güruh-ı bagiyyenin kuvvet zuhuru olan Tüysüzoğlu Mehmed nam hayin bir takrib-i eshel 
ile ahz ü girift olunub izaka-i seyf-i siyaset ve mayil-i fesad ve hıyanet olanlara ibret kılınıp...” 
BBA. HH. 17399, 3 Receb 1242 (31 January 1827). 
112 For the list of these individuals, see BBA. HH. 17452-B; 28 Şaban 1242 (27 March 1827); 17402-
A, 28 Şevval 1242 (25 May 1827); and 17402-H, Şevval 1242 (May 1827). Many of these individuals 
are of esnaf origin. 
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established.113 As is clearly seen, the viceroy does not seem to have acquired 
support neither from the people of Ayıntab nor from other regions. He does not 
mention any emotions of relief from the people in Ayıntab after he crushed the 
Janissaries. On the contrary, we find that his testimony illustrates the support 
from the people in Birecik for the Janissaries.  
Damascus was another region where the central government came across 
rebellion against the abolition of the Janissaries.114 Yet, as the reports from 
Damascus reveal, the Janissaries’ rebellion did not last long and the local 
governor prevailed within hours.115 How did the local governor succeed in 
suppressing the rebellion among the Janissaries although Damascus had always 
been a troublesome region for the central government as a result of its irregular 
taxation policies?116 The previous chapter has argued that the people, who joined 
                                                 
113 “…bakıyye-i firar-ı eşkiyanın dahi ahz ü girifti içun Rakka eyaletine müzaf Nizib ve Nizar ve 
... ve Birecik taraflarına derakab tatar çıkarılub buyuruldular neşr olunmuş ise de firar-i 
merkumeler havf ü hıras ile bir takrib Birecik kasabasına can atmış ve ahali-i kasaba-i 
mezburenin ekseri ocağ-ı mülga mensubatından olmak takribi firari-i merkumlara sahabet ile üç 
gün mesaferet ve yanlarına adam terfikiyle Rakkaya azimet ettirmiş olmalarıyla...Ayıntabdaki 
reaya-i beraya ve fukaranın yeniçerilerin tazallumundan kurtulduğu asayişin sağlandığı...” BBA. 
HH. 17399, 3 Receb 1242 (31 January 1827). 
114 For the petition of the kadı of Damascus, confirming the compliance of the people in 
Damascus, see “... şerefsüdur iden ferman-ı alişan Şam-ı şerife lede’l-vürud mütesellim 
mumaileyh ve Şam-ı şerifim cümle vücuh-ı ahalileri ve lazım el-huzur olanlar bi-cemihim ... 
mahlata nida ettirilerek ammeye ilan ve işaat olunub cümlesinin memleket-i merasim sem ü 
taati bade’l-eda devam-ı eyyam-ı umur-ı devlet ve şevket ve saltanat-ı hazret-i zıllallahi ve 
kiram-ı hünkam füru ubuhhet cenab ve katibnahileri davat-ı hayriyelerine mürazabat 
idüb...herkes emr-i hazıra-yı padişahiye mutiğ ve münkad olmağla...” BBA. HH. 17315, 1241 
(1826). 
115 “…birkaç saat zarfında perişan ve tenkil kılınarak yeniçeri ocağı namı bi’l-ittifak ref ve ilga...” 
BBA. HH. 17315-A, Gurre Zilkade 1241 (7 to 17 June 1826). 
116 Roger Owen argues that attempts by the Ottoman officials to increase taxes or strengthen their 
rule had always aroused popular opposition. According to him, local notables or the Janissaries 
could lead such opposition out of their concern as to the extension of the central authority. Roger 
Owen, The Middle East in the World Economy 1800-1914, London&New York, 1981, p.77. For a 
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the rebellion, were from a variety of origins. However, the fact that the 
Janissaries in Damascus were stationed outside the city walls117 may have been 
the reason why the local population, as a whole, did not support the Janissaries. 
It seems that the relations between the local population and the Janissaries were 
not strongly established, as was the case in the other provinces of the Empire. 
The local governor managed to acquire support from the local groups in 
destroying the Janissaries in Damascus. The regional differences seem to have 
played a major role as to the fate of the Janissaries.  
In the hatt-ı hümayun numbered 17321118, the governor of Çirmen,119 Esad 
Paşa reports that the Janissary corps, whom he qualifies as the source of malice, 
in his district had been destroyed and the Janissary members were executed. The 
governor argues that since Çirmen is a vast locality, it would not be appropriate 
for him to lack power.120 He asserts that keeping his region in order required 
power because of the threat of sedition from the Janissaries was still present.121 
As a result, the governor expresses his desire to recruit new soldiers and 
complains that he had difficulty in feeding these soldiers. He mentions certain 
                                                                                                                                                 
similar argument about Aleppo in the eighteenth century, see Abraham Marcus, The Middle East 
on the Eve of Modernity: Aleppo in the Eighteenth Century, New York, 1989, pp.58-59, 74. 
117 Philip S. Khoury, “Continuity and Change in Syrian Political Life: The Nineteenth and 
Twentieth Centuries,” The American Historical Review, vol. 96, Issue 5 (December, 1991), p.1379. 
118 BBA. HH. 17321, 7 Cemaziyelevvel 1242 (7 December 1826). 
119 Çirmen is a district northwest from Adrianople. However, the name Çirmen seems to be used 
for the whole Adrianople region at that time. 
120 “…Edirne dahi cesim memleket olarak kaffe-i evkatde vilatın miknete noksanlığı ca®iz 
olmayub...” BBA. HH. 17321, 7 Cemaziyelevvel 1242 (7 December 1826). 
121 “…erbab-ı fesad ... def ve tard olunmuş iseler de ... kaffe-i memalik ve biladel nizam ve fesadı 
herhalde kadr’ülhiye me®nut ise de ekser halde nizam u intizam-ı memleket vilatın miknetlüce 
bulunmasına me®tuniyetle...” BBA. HH. 17321, 7 Cemaziyelevvel 1242 (7 December 1826). 
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taxes,122 whose collection was previously banned by the Ottoman government, 
and the insufficiency of mukataa123 revenues in order to show that he was not 
able to pay the monthly salaries of the new soldiers as well as other expenses, 
which amounted to 80.000 to 90.000 silver coins monthly. In response to the 
request by Esad Paşa, the sultan states the concern of the government over the 
collection of certain taxes arguing that the local population would hear of this 
and it would discredit the sultan’s authority.124 Finally, the sultan orders that 
Esad Paşa could take the revenues from two neighboring districts for the time 
being. The sultan wanted to make sure that the governor would not try to collect 
other taxes because this would upset the poor in the sultan’s words. 
This hatt whose content I have summarized above gives us an idea about 
the situation in the aftermath of the destruction of the Janissaries. It shows us 
that the Janissaries played an important role in maintaining the local governor’s 
power in his district. We understand this from Esad Paşa’s remarks about the 
necessity of recruiting new soldiers in retaining his power and establishing 
order. The Janissaries, as an institution, must have fulfilled this duty before their 
abolition. Why is that significant? This conclusion is important because it may 
help us see how the agents of power are replaced in the new era. Ironically, the 
                                                 
122 “… ayaniye ve sıhhiye ve cerime ve kudumiye namıyla alınagelen mebaliğin alınmaması...” 
BBA. HH. 17321, 7 Cemaziyelevvel 1242 (7 December 1826). 
123 A branch of the public revenue of the Ottoman Empire farmed out for a term of years for a 
fixed sum. 
124 “… haliye ve harac defter namıyla akçe alınmasına ruhsat virilse şuyu bulmamak mümkün 
değildir ne kadar itidalane hareket ider ise de sa®ir mahallere refte refte sirayet iderek fukara 
hakkında mazarratı müztezim olacağından başka mukaddem ki emr-i şahanemize münafi 
görüneceğinden…” BBA. HH. 17321, 7 Cemaziyelevvel 1242 (7 December 1826). 
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former agents of power, the Janissaries, are accused of spreading trouble. Why 
are the Janissaries labeled corrupt? Is that because the Janissaries really started to 
terrorize the civilian population in the cities and provinces or is it because the 
Janissaries’ strong association with the society was not acceptable to the 
government, which sought to establish a central, modern form of power?  
In the same hatt-ı hümayun, we find the complaint of the local governor 
about the lack of financial resources. His referral to specific taxes is important 
because it shows how the government officials had difficulty in maintaining the 
necessary expenses as a result of the destruction of the Janissaries. In attempting 
to destroy the Janissaries, the Ottoman state had declared that the population 
would not be subject to new taxes. Almost every reform had meant new taxes for 
the Ottoman population during the 18th and the 19th centuries125 and the public 
probably assumed that the destruction of the Janissaries would mean new taxes 
as it had before. To discredit this common belief, the Ottoman sultan issued 
decrees guaranteeing that new taxes would not be introduced. The above decree 
shows us that this promise resulted in the government officials’ inability to raise 
sufficient revenues to meet their expenses. Although the Janissaries had been 
destroyed in the capital, in many provinces the situation was quite fragile and in 
many districts rebellions continued. The government was careful in not breaking 
its promise about taxes because this might increase the support among the 
                                                 
125 “…the military reforms were universally unpopular because they were accompanied by 
increased taxation, inflation, food shortages, and other economic hardships.” Avigdor Levy, 
“Military Reform and the Problem of Centralization in the Ottoman Empire in the Eighteenth 
Century,” Middle East Studies, vol.18, no.3, July 1982, p.240. 
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population for the Janissaries. That is why, the sultan is urging the governor of 
Çirmen that he limit his tax-collection to the two districts stated by the 
government and not disturb the poor. This hatt-ı hümayun sheds light on the 
financial difficulties of the Ottoman government in building a new form of 
power, while trying not to provoke any rebellious acts against the state. 
 In sum, the nature of resistances differed from one province to another. As 
shown above, the participation of a local population in the rebellion was limited 
and indirect whereas, in some other provinces, the Ottoman government had to 
cope with extensive social disturbances inaugurated with the destruction of the 
Janissary corps.126 Hatt-ı hümayuns demonstrate that the abolition of the Janissary 
corps resulted in the difficulties for the local governors who were expected not 
only to establish order but also to handle the resistance of the local power 
groups. Thus, the abolition of the Janissaries seems to have created an unstable 
situation in the provinces for the local governors and the central government.    
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
126 For instance, the rebellion in Bosnia was an organized widespread movement. Only 15 out of 
48 districts sent letters of obedience to the center. See Ahmet Cevat Eren, Mahmud II Zamanında 
Bosna-Hersek, İstanbul, 1965, pp.73-79. Bosnia is not discussed in our study because of our lack of 
hatt-ı hümayun documents concerning Bosnia. However, secondary sources point to a large 
mutiny in Bosnia.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
This study is an attempt to raise questions as to the validity of certain 
common assumptions about the destruction of the Janissary corps in June 1826. 
The historians of Ottoman history have generally shared the idea that the 
destruction of the Janissaries was an indispensable necessity because of their 
obsoleteness and corruption. I have attempted to uncover the underlying 
suppositions of this idea, which were generated by the modernization paradigm, 
and provides a critique of historiography of the Janissary corps in general. The 
so-called corruption of the Janissaries seems to be a mere pretext of the Ottoman 
government to legitimize Vaka-i Hayriye. The Janissaries might have committed 
crimes as described by the official historians. However, these crimes seem to 
have had secondary importance when compared to the social threat posed by the 
Janissaries and their affiliates.     
I attempt to challenge the above-mentioned conventional perceptions of 
the Janissaries by using the imperial rescripts (hatt-ı hümayuns) of the Ottoman 
government. The hatt-ı hümayun documents are of great importance in writing 
the history of the abolition of the Janissary corps. The method employed in using 
these documents is critical because of their official nature, as this paper has 
attempted to show. Yet, it is still possible to comprehend many diverse aspects of 
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the matter through a meticulous examination of these documents. As these 
documents show, the Janissaries had profound relationships with various socio-
economic and religious groups, which were established in public spaces such as 
coffeehouses and esnaf workshops, in contrast to the picture presented by 
modern historians who perceive those connections as the source of corruption of 
the Janissaries. I argue that the intermingling of the Janissaries with these societal 
groups paved the way for their destruction since they had become an obstacle for 
the project of modernization of the Ottoman state and society.  
Differing responses of the population in the provinces and in the capital 
help us understand the methods employed by the Ottoman government in 
establishing the new order. The reactions to the destruction of the Janissaries 
varied from one province to another, depending on the extent to which the 
Janissaries were associated with the local population. The reactions of the 
population took diverse forms, namely collaboration with the government, mere 
submission, acceptance, disturbance, and rebellion etc. I argue that the instability 
triggered by the Janissaries in the provinces was perceived as a threat to the new 
reforms, which aimed to institute a centralized modern government as opposed 
to the previous times where the localities had relative autonomy. The Ottoman 
government pursued various methods in order to ensure the compliance of the 
provinces and ease the tensions created by the destruction of the Janissaries. It is 
demonstrated that the Ottoman government could not proceed with its reform 
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efforts because of the strong resistance, which appeared in different forms, from 
the provinces.  
Vaka-i Hayriye should be interpreted in the context of the centralization 
efforts of the Ottoman government in relation to the modernization process of 
the Ottoman state. The establishment of modern institutions was in contradiction 
with the interests of the societal groups that were not identical with those of the 
Ottoman government. The central government targeted the Janissaries in an 
attempt to dispose these groups of their privileged position in Ottoman society. 
Centralization of power entailed the elimination of groups who posed a threat to 
the ultimate authority of the central government. Thus, Vaka-i Hayriye was the 
result of a clash between the disciplinary nature of modern power and the 
opposition of certain societal groups in Ottoman society.  
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